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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most people place great value on their liberty. In fact, some would 
rather die than live without it.1 The quest for liberty has been one of the 
strongest currents in modern political and intellectual history and has 
been a driving force in the founding of the United States as well as 
economic and political developments in Europe and around the world.2 
This Article takes the advancement of liberty seriously, both as an 
important part of American and European culture, history, and politics3 
and as an objective in the ongoing work of reforming and restructuring 
the law and legal systems across the globe. The examples focus on 
United States law,4 but the same issues and problems pervade other legal 
systems as well. The analysis does not presume that liberty is the only 
social value of importance, but it focuses on the relationship between 
law and liberty to put the connections between the two in the clearest 
light possible. The great advantage of focusing the analysis on liberty for 
its own sake is that the reader does not have to accept idiosyncratic value 
judgments. Almost everyone values liberty and cares about the ways in 
which the law may advance or impede it. 
In spite of the importance that most people attach to liberty, it is not 
always clear what we mean when we refer to it. Scholars have debated 
the relative importance of different kinds of liberty and have drawn 
useful distinctions, for example, between the freedom from evils, such as 
 
 1.  The most famous pronouncement was no doubt by Patrick Henry, who ended a speech to 
the Virginia Convention on March 23, 1775, with the emphatic declaration, “[G]ive me liberty or 
give me death!” See 1 WILLIAM WIRT HENRY, PATRICK HENRY: LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND 
SPEECHES 266 (1969). 
 2.  The role that the quest for liberty plays in the American imagination is reflected in the 
titles of numerous books. See, e.g., 1 ERIC FONER, GIVE ME LIBERTY!: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 
(3d ed. 2010); JOY HAKIM ET AL., FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF US (2002); and KENNETH BRIDGES, 
FREEDOM IN AMERICA (2007). Slavery was an abomination against liberty, but even the history of 
slavery has been cast in many books as a struggle for liberty. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & 
EVELYN HIGGINBOTHAM, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS (9th 
ed. 2010); JULIUS LESTER, FROM SLAVE SHIP TO FREEDOM ROAD (1999); and JAMES OAKES, 
FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1861-1865 (2014). 
 3.  The role that the pervasive yearning for freedom played in the development of western 
culture and politics is thoroughly documented in 1 ORLANDO PATTERSON, FREEDOM: FREEDOM IN 
THE MAKING OF WESTERN CULTURE (1991). 
 4.  The “American experiment” has been portrayed as an experiment in the application of the 
classical liberal thought of the Age of Enlightenment to the founding of a nation. See, e.g., 
ADRIENNE KOCH, THE AMERICAN ENLIGHTENMENT: THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 
AND A FREE SOCIETY (1965). References to the “American experiment” date to 1 ALEXIS DE 
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 25 (1900), who wrote, “In that land the great experiment 
was to be made, by civilized man, of the attempt to construct society upon a new basis; and it was 
there, for the first time, that theories hitherto unknown, or deemed impracticable, were to exhibit a 
spectacle for which the world had not been prepared by the history of the past.” 
2
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physical force or coercion exerted by others, and the freedom to act, 
such as the freedom to speak one’s mind or worship the religion of one’s 
choice.5 Nonetheless, there is no consensus about the freedoms that are 
essential to liberty, and so its meaning remains nebulous and elusive. To 
focus the analysis, therefore, liberty is defined to require 1) that 
individuals6 be as free as possible from the exercise of coercion7 by 
others, including the State,8 except to the extent that they have truly and 
voluntarily assented to the coercion, and 2) that individuals have a 
sphere of personal autonomy and privacy within which they are free 
from intrusions by the State or others to think what they will, say what 
they want, associate with whomever they like, and be whoever they are.9 
While the appropriate scope of autonomy and privacy rights may be 
debatable, few, if any, would dispute that they are integral to liberty. 
There is a wide range of literature on the relationship between law 
and liberty, but most of it focuses specifically on the relationship 
between public law and liberty.10 Public law is usually defined as the 
branch of the law that addresses relationships between levels of 
 
 5.  See, in particular, ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 146 (1969). See also Ian 
Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, (Mar. 5, 2012) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/liberty-positive-negative/. 
 6.  The term “individual” is used in this Article exclusively to mean natural persons, as 
opposed to corporate persons. 
 7.  The word “coercion” is also necessarily nebulous and ill-defined. The word is used here 
in the sense that FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 20-21 (1960) defined it, 
which is to mean “such control of the environment or circumstances of a person by another that, in 
order to avoid greater evil, he is forced to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to 
serve the ends of another.” 
 8.  When a capital “S” is used in the word “State,” it is meant to indicate a reference to 
government generally, not a state government within the United States. 
 9.  The first part of this definition of liberty is from HAYEK, supra note 7, at 11 (liberty is 
“that condition of men in which coercion of some by others is reduced as much as is 
possible . . . .”). The second part of the definition is derived from the importance accorded by 
libertarian writers to individuals having personal spheres of autonomy and privacy. Consider, for 
example, Hayek’s further observations that “[c]oercion . . . cannot be altogether avoided because the 
only way to prevent it is by the threat of coercion. Free society has met this problem by conferring 
the monopoly of coercion on the [S]tate and by attempting to limit this power of the [S]tate . . . . 
This is possible only by the [S]tate’s protecting known private spheres . . . .” Id. at 21. See also 
RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 14 (1998) 
(“Given the various problems that arise when humans live and act in society with others, the 
classical liberal answer . . . was that each person needed a ‘space’ over which he or she has sole 
jurisdiction or liberty to act and within which no one else may rightfully interfere.”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 10.  See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (1973); RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED 
GOVERNMENT (2014); and BARNETT, supra note 9.   
3
Smythe: Liberty at the Borders of Private Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
01 SMYTHE - MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:19 PM 
4 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:01 
government and relationships between governments and individuals.11 
Scholars have no doubt focused on public law and liberty because there 
are so many important public law questions that bear on the liberties of 
individuals—for example, the powers of governments to regulate 
speech, engage in searches and seizures of persons and property 
incidental to an arrest, or to regulate the right to bear arms. 
This Article, on the other hand, focuses on the relationship between 
private law and liberty. Private law is usually defined as the branch of 
law that addresses the relationships between individuals, rather than 
between individuals and their governments.12 There is already a 
significant amount of literature addressing the relationships between 
private law and liberty, but much of it focuses on the justifications for 
private law and the role of the government in facilitating and regulating 
private legal transactions.13 Most of it has very little to say about specific 
private law doctrines.14 In contrast, this Article explores the ways in 
which specific private law doctrines may advance or impede liberty. 
One of the lynchpins in the analysis is the simple and 
noncontroversial observation that when courts enforce private legal 
rights they exercise the powers of State coercion against the parties 
subject to their enforcements.15 Courts’ decisions about whether to 
enforce claims under private laws therefore have direct consequences for 
liberty. The courts thus play an important role in advancing liberty 
through their enforcement or non-enforcement of private legal claims 
under well-known contract and property doctrines. Unfortunately, there 
are some important ways in which courts may also undermine liberty 
through their enforcement or non-enforcement of some private legal 
 
 11.  Jonathan Law & Elizabeth A. Martin, Public Law, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW (7th 
ed. 2014), available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/
9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248-e-3146?rskey=ws5Gap&result=3315 (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2014). 
 12.  Jonathan Law & Elizabeth A. Martin, Private Law, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LAW (7th 
ed. 2014), available at http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/
9780199551248.001.0001/acref-9780199551248-e-3032?rskey=6jZnt0&result=3201 (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2014). 
 13.  For example, Friedrich Hayek, Richard Epstein, and Randy Barnett have all addressed 
aspects of the relationship between private law and liberty, but with a much larger purpose and 
broader focus that placed the relationship within the context of public law issues. See HAYEK, supra 
note 7; EPSTEIN, supra note 10; and BARNETT, supra note 9. 
 14.  Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 78-79 (2010) 
critiques libertarian theories of property on the grounds that they are consequentialist and not rooted 
in a conception of individual rights. This Article concurs with Freyfogle, but seeks to explicate the 
relationship between private law doctrines and liberty recognizing, as he does, that the connections 
are highly nuanced. 
 15.  See infra Part II. 
4
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claims under some other well-known contract and property doctrines. 
Another one of the lynchpins of the analysis is the equally simple 
and noncontroversial observation that corporate persons are created 
under state laws for the benefit of their owners and/or other interested 
parties and, presumably, for the good of society. Both for-profit and non-
profit corporations enjoy rights and privileges under the law, including, 
for example, the right to sue and be sued, limited liability, and 
preferential tax treatment; they are, in that sense, State-sponsored 
entities.16 In return for the rights and privileges they enjoy, they are 
often subjected to restrictions and regulations that do not apply to natural 
persons—for example, a for-profit corporation may have reporting 
obligations under securities regulations and a non-profit corporation may 
not be allowed to participate in political campaigns. Although they are 
private legal entities, because of the rights and privileges they enjoy 
under state and federal law, the State is complicit whenever a 
corporation impinges upon the liberties of natural persons. In particular, 
the State is complicit whenever a corporation impinges upon an 
individual’s liberty by intruding into her sphere of personal autonomy 
and privacy. The concern may be mitigated when the corporation is for-
profit, subject to the discipline of the market, but it is exacerbated when 
the corporation is non-profit that receives significant tax exemptions as a 
public charity.17 
This Article argues that private laws are no less important to liberty 
than public laws and that if private laws are constructed and applied 
appropriately they will advance liberty, but if not, they may actually 
facilitate the exercise of coercion and, therefore, undermine liberty. To 
that end, this Article illustrates some of the ways in which certain well-
known private law doctrines may advance liberty.18 But it also expresses 
concerns about the application of some other private law doctrines. One 
of the concerns lies in the fear that private laws may sometimes allow 
some individuals and corporations to use the courts, and implicitly, 
therefore, the power of State coercion, to impinge upon the liberty of 
other individuals. This concern is explicated using private land use 
restrictions as an example. Another concern is that private laws may 
allow corporations to use their rights and privileges to intrude into the 
 
 16.  See infra Part II. 
 17.  See infra Part II. 
 18.  This Article does not intend to imply that private law doctrines were devised to advance 
liberty, although further investigation of the matter may be justified; it merely observes the role of 
private law doctrines in advancing liberty and suggests ways in which private law doctrines might 
be revised to advance liberty still further. 
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spheres of personal autonomy and privacy that are essential to the liberty 
of natural persons. This concern is explicated using lifestyle covenants 
and morals clauses as an example. 
Part II of this Article discusses the relationships between liberty, 
the State, and private law and elaborates on some of the presumptions of 
the analysis. Part III focuses on the relationships between liberty and 
specific property law doctrines. It uses examples from human rights, the 
first in time, first in right rule, findings and adverse possession, and 
eminent domain to illustrate some of the ways in which property 
doctrines may advance or undermine liberty, depending on whether the 
doctrines are appropriately constructed and applied. It also raises 
concerns about the ways in which property law may systematically 
undermine liberty, using courts’ enforcements of some private land-use 
restrictions as an example. Part IV focuses on the relationships between 
liberty and specific contract law doctrines. It uses examples from the 
parol evidence rule, the unconscionability doctrine, and the 
impracticability doctrine to illustrate the ways in which contract 
doctrines may advance or undermine liberty, depending on whether the 
doctrines are appropriately constructed and applied. It also raises 
concerns about the ways in which contract law may systematically 
undermine liberty, using, as an example, the practices of some State-
sponsored, non-profit corporations that use lifestyle covenants and 
morals clauses in their employment contracts to intrude into their 
employees’ spheres of personal autonomy and privacy. Part V offers 
some conclusions. 
II. LIBERTY, THE STATE, AND PRIVATE LAW 
Liberty is both dependent upon and limited by the State. The State 
protects individuals from the coercion of others, but paradoxically, it 
must exercise coercion itself in doing so.19 For example, an individual is 
protected (to some degree) from acts of physical violence against her 
person in part because other individuals know that such acts are 
prohibited by criminal laws and will be subject to punishment by the 
State. The use of force or the threat of the use of force by individuals 
against other individuals is discouraged by the State’s threat of the use of 
force against anyone who perpetrates acts of violence against others.20 
The State thus necessarily relies on coercion to protect individuals from 
the coercion of others. If the social objective was to maximize individual 
 
 19.  HAYEK, supra note 7, at 21. 
 20.  Id. 
6
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liberty, the State’s use of coercion would be justified only if it reduced 
the amount of coercion exercised by individuals against other 
individuals by a greater amount.21 
This does not necessarily mean that a free society should rely 
exclusively on the power of the State to deter coercion. There might be 
less coercion overall if individuals—or groups of individuals—assumed 
some of the responsibility for protecting themselves. For example, a 
neighborhood association might be able to prevent many crimes against 
property and persons simply by exercising some vigilance without the 
need to involve the police and courts.22 That would lessen the burden on 
the criminal justice system, while at the same time diminishing the 
exercise of coercion overall. In fact, almost every society relies to some 
extent on the ability of its citizens to protect themselves against 
transgressors, whether it is through simple vigilance, a credible threat of 
resistance against the use of force, or the threat of the use of force in 
self-defense or even retaliation.23 Nonetheless, every developed society 
still relies primarily on the State to deter coercion, and this inevitably 
raises concerns about the abuses of State power. 
A Constitution Mitigates Concern Regarding State Abuse of Its Powers 
of Coercion 
The reliance on the State to deter coercion raises the possibility that 
the State’s powers of coercion might be abused. A constitution that 
constrains the exercise of the State’s coercive powers helps to mitigate 
those concerns. There are a variety of ways in which a constitution 
might protect individual liberties against encroachments by the State. 
 
 21.  It is not clear whether anyone believes that the State’s sole objective should be to 
maximize individual liberty. Libertarian scholars have usually focused on minimizing the size and 
role of the State. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974). Even 
Nozick concedes, however, that “[w]hatever its virtues, it appears clear that the minimal [S]tate is 
no utopia.” Id. at 297. 
 22.  Robert Nozick, for example, discusses the ways in which individuals in the state of nature 
might form “protective associations.” Id. at 12-15. He argues, however, that even a “dominant 
protective association”—a protective association that might emerge from a state of anarchy to bring 
a semblance of order to a particular geographical area—would fall short of fulfilling the 
requirements of a State. Id. at 15-25. 
 23.  The use of force by individuals against other individuals raises nuanced problems. It may, 
for example, undermine the State’s monopoly of the use of force. HAYEK, supra note 7, at 21. But 
the use of force by individuals arguably does not undermine the monopoly of the State over the use 
of force if the State, through its laws, delegates to individuals the right to use force in self-defense. 
Randy Barnett provides a detailed justification of the right of self-defense. See BARNETT, supra note 
9, at 184-91. The use of force by individuals in retaliation for others’ use of force against them is 
more problematic. 
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For example, a constitution arguably should separate the powers of 
government to provide appropriate checks and balances between and 
within its branches and constrain any one branch from impinging on 
liberties too far.24 If the executive branch has a veto over new 
legislation, for example, this limits the power of the legislature to enact 
statutes that might impinge on citizens’ liberties.25 If the legislature is a 
bicameral one, this means that any new legislation must have a coalition 
of support in two chambers rather than one, again limiting the power of 
the legislature to enact statutes that might impinge on liberties.26 
A constitution arguably should also place hard constraints on the 
nature of the coercion that may be used by the State. For example, a 
constitution might constrain the State from imposing cruel and unusual 
punishments, even though such punishments might have a strong enough 
deterrent effect to reduce the amount of coercion exercised in society 
overall.27 The State’s use of such extreme punishments might offend 
such basic human dignities that the reduction in other forms of coercion 
might not justify the increased deterrent effect.28 To give another 
example, a constitution might constrain the State from conducting some 
searches and seizures, even though the searches and seizures might help 
to detect and deter the use of coercion by some citizens against others so 
much that they would reduce the amount of coercion overall. Some 
searches and seizures might intrude into individuals’ privacy so much 
that the reduction in the exercise of coercion overall might not justify the 
impingement on their liberty.29 
Ultimately, of course, there are considerations other than ensuring 
that individuals are free from coercion that must also be factored in any 
calculus of a just society. Thus, many constitutional provisions in the 
United States and other nations have less relevance to protecting liberties 
than they do to advancing other core social values. These core social 
 
 24.  BARNETT, supra note 9, at 253-54. See also ROBERT D. COOTER, THE STRATEGIC 
CONSTITUTION 215-39 (2000). 
 25.  COOTER, supra note 24, at 215-23. 
 26.  Id. at 223-25. 
 27.  Barnett goes so far as to argue against using any punishments as deterrents to committing 
crimes. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 216-37. He argues that the deterrence effect might be illusory, 
and that it is, in any case, immoral. One of his concerns is that innocent people will always be 
wrongfully subjected to punishments, and the severity of the punishments necessary to provide 
deterrence to others exacerbates the injustice. Id. at 225-33. 
 28.  As Justice Brennan wrote, “[T]he extreme severity of a punishment makes it degrading to 
the dignity of human beings.” Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238, 272 (1972). 
 29.  As Justice Frankfurter wrote, “The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by 
the police . . . is basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in ‘the concept of ordered 
liberty’ . . . .” Wolf v. Colo., 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). 
8
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values often reflect the cultural importance of fundamental human 
dignities such as the right to equal protection of the laws or the right to 
due process in the administration of justice. Thus, the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment militates against the State 
exercising its coercive powers unequally,30 and the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment provides procedural safeguards to militate against 
unfair incarcerations.31 The protections and rights afforded by such 
constitutional provisions do not necessarily diminish the amount of 
coercion exercised in a society overall—they might actually increase 
it—but they are obviously vested with great social importance and, in 
that sense, transcend the need for social order. 
B. Justifications for Private Laws in Free Society 
The need for public laws that constrain State actors is so widely 
accepted that it is virtually taken for granted. Considerably less attention 
has been devoted to the role of the State in the creation and enforcement 
of private laws. Of course, some libertarian scholars have gone to great 
pains to explain why private laws are justified in a free society at all. In 
fact, the libertarian justifications for having a State-enforced system of 
private law are far from obvious. One obvious argument is that property 
and contract laws help to reduce coercion by preventing private disputes 
between individuals from escalating into conflicts that involve the use of 
force or the threat of force between the disputants. But that argument is 
less than fully persuasive. In theory, at least, the State could protect the 
rights of its citizens to only their own persons.32 In other words, all 
property could be communal, and the State could decline to enforce any 
private agreements.33 Everyone would thus have rights to use all land 
 
 30.  Although the Supreme Court rarely applied the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), it has since then frequently 
used the Equal Protection Clause to combat “invidious discrimination and . . . [safeguard] 
fundamental rights.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 668 
(3d ed. 2006).  
 31.  The Bill of Rights provides many protections against unfair incarcerations. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 566. The United States Supreme Court has stated that “the interest 
of being free from physical detention by one’s own government” is “the most elemental of liberty 
interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). 
 32.  Richard Epstein, for example, recognized the potential limitations of minimalist State 
libertarian arguments when he observed “A system of liberty may well give each person rights over 
his or her own person, but it does not in and of itself do much to assign ownership rights over things 
in the external world.” RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SKEPTICISM AND FREEDOM: A MODERN CASE FOR 
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM 38 (2003). This concurs with Robert Nozick’s view that “the minimal 
[S]tate is no utopia.” NOZICK, supra note 21, at 297. 
 33.  Communal property rights would entail that everyone had the right to use the property 
9
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and chattels, but no one would have the right to exclude others from the 
use of land or chattels or to use the courts to enforce private agreements. 
A nation without a system of private law would probably best 
resemble some traditional hunting and gathering societies. While it 
might be peaceful and largely free from the exercise of coercion, it 
probably would not provide a good foundation for the material 
prosperity or advancement of its citizens.34 It is perhaps not surprising 
therefore that some libertarian justifications for private law appear to rest 
on utilitarian arguments,35 such as the argument that private law 
facilitates cooperation and mutually gainful transactions or the argument 
that it maximizes the value of all property holdings by individuals within 
a society.36 Indeed, there is widespread agreement that private property 
rights and contract law provide important incentives for investments in 
land, new technologies, and new methods of production, not to mention 
the incentive for greater work effort and productivity.37 While economic 
progress might not directly reduce the amount of coercion exercised in a 
society, it might significantly increase the value that individuals derive 
from the liberty and freedoms that they have. 
Other libertarian justifications for having a system of private law 
rely on non-consequentialist arguments.38 Private law concepts have a 
strong appeal to those who accept the basic tenets of natural rights and 
natural law theory.39 In some cases, natural rights justifications for 
private law overlap with consequentialist ones.40 Indeed, some scholars 
 
but no one had the right to exclude others from its use. In other words, individuals would have 
property rights, but not private property rights. If the State declined to define and enforce contract 
laws, individuals could still make private agreements with one another, but they could not rely on 
the State to enforce their agreements. 
 34.  The notion that hunting and gathering societies were prosperous and afforded ample 
leisure may be a myth. In fact, the notion that they were generally peaceful may be a myth too. See 
Noble or Savage, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 2007, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/10278703.   
 35.  See generally FREYFOGLE, supra note 14. 
 36.  See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, DESIGN FOR LIBERTY: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW 79 (2011) (“the key challenge for the legal system is to 
identify the set of consistent property uses that maximizes the value of the holdings of all 
individuals within the group . . . .”). HAYEK, supra note 7, at 61, however, sounded a warning about 
the limitations of consequentialist arguments: “Those who believe that all useful institutions are 
deliberate contrivances and who cannot conceive of anything serving a human purpose that has not 
been consciously designed are almost of necessity enemies of freedom.” 
 37.  This is such a basic postulate of economics that is accepted by economists of almost all 
schools of thought. 
 38.  BARNETT, supra note 9, at 4-26 discusses natural rights, natural law, and utilitarian 
methods of analyzing the law. 
 39.  See, e.g., id. 
 40.  Thus, for example, Randy Barnett purports to provide a natural rights justification for the 
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simply seem to presume that private property rights attach to individuals 
as naturally as the rights they have in their own persons. The intuitive 
appeal of property and contracts might make the need to justify a system 
of private law appear unimportant, but it would be a mistake to presume 
the need for a system of private law since the justification for having a 
system of private law arguably provides the basis for evaluating the 
private laws that we have. This Article presumes that the purpose of the 
State is to advance liberty. Thus, the question that it seeks to answer is 
how should private laws be devised and applied if the objective is to 
advance liberty? 
C. The State’s Role in Enforcing Private Laws 
It is helpful to begin by clarifying the role of the State in the 
enforcement of private laws. In most developed countries, the dual 
principles of party autonomy and party responsibility apply.41 Thus, 
individual members of a society are generally free to dispose of their 
property as they wish and enter into whatever agreements they like; thus, 
they may create their own private legal rights and obligations, but they 
are also responsible for asserting their own private legal rights and 
defending themselves against others who might attempt to hold them to 
legal obligations they dispute. Ultimately, however, courts enforce 
private legal rights and obligations, and courts are State actors.42 When a 
court enforces a private property right or a contractual obligation it does 
so with the full force of the State’s coercive powers behind it.43 Anyone 
 
structure of private law that is only indirectly consequentialist. Id. at 23. 
 41.  See, e.g., Stefan Grundmann, Information, Party Autonomy and Economic Agents in 
European Contract Law, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 269, 270-72 (2002). 
 42.  This is a statement of fact, not a statement about United States law. As CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 30, at 527 observed, “[T]here seems little doubt that judges are government actors and 
that judicial remedies are state action.” Nonetheless, the United States Supreme Court has generally 
limited the definition of State action under the State action doctrine to acts undertaken by the 
executive and legislative branches. See id. at 507-27. Thus, actions undertaken by the judicial 
branch, including court enforcements of private legal rights, are generally not considered State acts 
under the State action doctrine. Id. The most important exception is Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 
14 (1948), in which the United States Supreme Court held that “action of state courts and judicial 
officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the state within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.” Shelley, however, was an exceptional case involving a challenge against 
racially restrictive covenants. The Supreme Court has not followed Shelley in other cases and has, 
therefore, generally not treated other court actions in other cases as State action. CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 30, at 528. 
 43.  This is not a new observation. For example, in the wake of Shelley v. Kraemer some 
scholars argued that all judicial enforcements of private legal obligations should be treated as State 
action. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. 
REV. 473 (1962). Those arguments were rebutted by counters that the Equal Protection Clause of 
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who declines to respect a court’s injunction can be held in contempt and 
subjected to an escalating series of State-imposed penalties, even 
imprisonment; and anyone who declines to pay a money judgment can 
have her property subjected to an execution and levy or her wages 
garnished.44 State coercion is thus the bedrock of any system of private 
law. 
It is important to emphasize that this is not an argument against the 
State action doctrine. Under the State action doctrine, individuals have 
constitutional protections against only State actions, not against actions 
of other private individuals.45 The argument that courts’ enforcements of 
private legal rights are a form of State action is not an argument that 
individuals should have constitutional protections against actions of 
other private individuals. It is merely an argument that when courts 
provide individuals with a remedy for a violation of their private legal 
rights by another individual the courts are engaging in State action; it is 
not an argument that courts engage in State action when they decline to 
provide individuals with a remedy for an alleged violation of their legal 
rights by another individual.46 When a court declines to enforce a private 
legal right it does not take any action at all, let alone State action.47 In 
fact, it is important to remember that a court’s decision not to provide a 
remedy for an alleged violation of a private legal right is not tantamount 
to the court’s—or the State’s—approval of anyone’s actions.48 An 
 
the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to apply only against state governments and not to 
regulate the behavior of private individuals. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Thoughts on State Action: 
The “Government Function” and “Power Theory” Approaches, 3 WASH. U. L. REV. 757, 762 
(1979). The analysis in this Article, however, is directed at the relationship between private law and 
liberty. The judicial enforcement of private legal obligations is an exercise of State coercion, and 
one way of disciplining that exercise of State coercion would be by expanding the scope of State 
action under the State action doctrine. 
 44.  1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 12-18 (2d ed. 
1993). 
 45.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 507. 
 46.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 514-16, 521-25 
(1985) argued that courts’ failure to provide a legal remedy for a violation of an alleged private 
legal right should constitute State action. Since this would make private individuals liable to other 
private individuals for violating their constitutional rights, it would effectively abolish the 
distinction between State action and the actions of private individuals. But when a court declines to 
enforce a private legal right or provide any other remedy for an alleged violation of a private legal 
right, it does not take any action at all in the sense that is meant here. 
 47.  This equates a court’s actions with its provision of remedies. A court that declines to 
provide a remedy thus refrains from taking action. Obviously, one could counter that a court’s 
decision not to provide a remedy is also a court action. But that would be tantamount to arguing that 
not taking an action is an action too. 
 48.  Scott E. Sundby, Is Abandoning State Action Asking Too Much of the Constitution?, 17 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139, 140 (1989). 
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individual’s private actions could be morally reprehensible and even 
harmful to other individuals and yet not provide others with a right to a 
legal remedy.49 
The distinction between courts’ actions and their decisions not to 
act is an important one because courts’ enforcements of private legal 
rights involve the exercise of the State’s power of coercion while courts’ 
decisions not to enforce private legal rights do not. If the applicable 
definition of State action under the State action doctrine was expanded 
to include courts’ enforcements of private legal rights but not to include 
courts’ decisions not to enforce private legal rights, courts would be 
prevented from enforcing private legal rights when doing so would 
violate the constitutional constraints on State actions against individuals. 
However, this would not allow individuals to make constitutional claims 
against other individuals. In other words, an individual would be unable 
to have a court enforce a racially restrictive covenant against his 
neighbor, but, absent some restriction against flying flags in general, his 
neighbors could not prevent him from flying a Confederate flag, 
regardless of how morally reprehensible they—and the courts—might 
think it was to fly one. State coercion would be used only to protect 
liberty, not to impede it. 
That is not to say that this is going to happen anytime soon. 
Constitutional doctrines usually evolve gradually, and sometimes not at 
all.50 The State action doctrine has many critics, but it also has many 
supporters,51 and it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will broaden the 
applicable definition of State action under the State action doctrine any 
time soon. While that may be regrettable, it does not diminish the most 
important point, which is that courts’ enforcements of private legal 
rights involve the exercise of the State’s power of coercion and that they, 
therefore, have important implications for liberty. Courts’ decisions not 
to enforce private legal rights do not involve the exercise of the State’s 
power of coercion, and they therefore do not have any direct 
implications for liberty. 
This is important because, if the primary purpose of the State is to 
advance liberty, and if liberty is advanced by reducing the exercise of 
 
 49.  For example, a homeowner might fly a Confederate flag over his house. The flag might 
be offensive to many others, yet, absent some private land-use restriction on flying such a flag, the 
neighbors would have no private legal right to a remedy. That hardly implies that flying a 
Confederate flag is condoned by either the courts or the State. 
 50.  As CHEMERINSKY, supra note 30, at 7 observed, the purpose of a constitution is to 
entrench important social values in a way that will make it very difficult for them to change rapidly. 
 51.  Sundby, supra note 48, at 139-44. 
13
Smythe: Liberty at the Borders of Private Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
01 SMYTHE - MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:19 PM 
14 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:01 
coercion, then courts’ decisions to enforce private legal rights require 
more justification than their decisions not to enforce private legal rights. 
It is therefore not enough to provide a sweeping justification for a 
system of private law overall.52 What is needed is a justification of the 
specific private law doctrines that authorize courts to enforce particular 
private legal rights. What is also needed is an understanding of when 
courts’ enforcements of private legal rights might actually interfere with 
liberty and an understanding about how legislatures or courts could 
rectify the problems.53 
D. Private Law—Individuals and Corporations 
Of course, not all private transactions are between individuals—that 
is, natural persons—and other individuals. Some private transactions are 
between individuals and corporations and others are between 
corporations and other corporations. Corporations are created under state 
laws.54 They are, in that sense, State-sponsored entities. Moreover, they 
enjoy rights and privileges that provide benefits to their stakeholders. In 
fact, that is why they are formed. For example, organizing a business as 
a for-profit corporation provides the shareholders with the protections of 
limited liability.55 It may also offer them the advantages of transferable 
ownership shares, capital gains tax rates as opposed to income tax rates, 
and the alleviation of agency problems.56 A non-profit corporation has 
no shareholders, but it does have stakeholders. Its stakeholders are 
initially those who form the corporation, and subsequently may include 
its officers, senior employees, and major donors.57 A non-profit 
corporation usually benefits from sweeping tax exemptions, since it 
usually pays no income, property or sales taxes.58 
 
 52.  Libertarian scholars have tended to focus more on justifying a system of private law than 
on analyzing the role of specific private law doctrines in advancing or limiting liberty. See, e.g., 
HAYEK, supra note 7; BARNETT, supra note 9; and NOZICK, supra note 21. 
 53.  This is not to suggest that we should look to the State for solutions to all our social 
problems. The problems here are a consequence of State action—court enforcements of private law 
doctrines that impinge on the liberty of individuals—and the only way of addressing them is by 
imposing legal constraints on State actors—here the courts.   
 54.  REINER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY 
HANSMANN, GERAD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 34 (2d ed. 2009). 
 55.  Id. at 9-11. 
 56.  Id. at 11-14. 
 57.  EDWARD L. GLAESER, THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, 1–44 
(2003). 
 58.  Id. See also Henry B. Hansmann, The Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations 
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54, 55-57 (1981). 
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Since corporations are State-sponsored entities with rights and 
privileges that individuals do not enjoy, private transactions between 
individuals and corporations raise questions about the nature of the State 
sponsorship and its implications for the liberty of the individuals. If 
liberty requires not just that individuals be as free from coercion as 
possible, but also that they have spheres of personal autonomy and 
privacy, and if the transactions between individuals and corporations 
intrude into individuals’ spheres of personal autonomy and privacy, then 
the State may indirectly contribute to the impingement upon the liberty 
of individuals through its sponsorship of the corporations. If securing the 
liberty of individuals is the ultimate purpose of the State, transactions 
between corporations and individuals that may intrude into individuals’ 
liberty should be subjected to careful scrutiny. In particular, it is 
important to ask whether the State’s sponsorship of any particular 
corporations contributes to intrusions into individuals’ liberty of any 
particular kind and, if it does, whether legislatures or courts might be 
able to provide any solutions to the problems.59 
III. LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF PROPERTY 
This section focuses on the relationships between liberty and 
specific property law doctrines. It uses examples from human rights, the 
first in time, first in right rule, findings and adverse possession, and 
eminent domain to illustrate some of the ways in which property 
doctrines may advance or undermine liberty, depending on whether the 
doctrines are appropriately constructed and applied. But it also raises 
concerns about the ways in which property law may systematically 
undermine liberty, using courts’ enforcements of some private land-use 
restrictions as an example. 
Private land-use restrictions may intrude into a property owner’s 
sphere of personal autonomy and privacy in ways that public land-use 
restrictions cannot because they would be unconstitutional. This Article 
argues, therefore, that courts should be restrained from enforcing private 
land-use restrictions that would be unconstitutional if they were public 
land-use restrictions.60 This could be accomplished through 1) an 
expansion in the definition of State action under the State action doctrine 
 
 59.  Once again, this is not to suggest that we should look to the State for a solution to all 
social problems, but here the problems may arise because of the State’s sponsorship of corporate 
behavior that may intrude into individuals’ liberty, and the best solutions therefore may be ones that 
mitigate the adverse impact of the State’s policies. 
 60.  See infra Part III.C. 
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that would make courts’ enforcement of private land-use restrictions 
subject to all the constitutional constraints on public land-use 
restrictions, 2) the enactment of state statutes that would make courts’ 
enforcement of private land-use restrictions subject to all the 
constitutional constraints on public land-use restrictions, or 3) an 
expansion in the public policy restraint on courts’ enforcement of private 
land-use restrictions that would make private land-use restrictions 
unenforceable whenever they would be unconstitutional if they were 
public land-use restrictions.61 
Part III.A will discuss liberty and human rights and Part III.B will 
discuss the first in time, first in right rule, findings and adverse 
possession, and eminent domain. Finally, Part III.C will discuss the 
ways in which private land-use restrictions may be used to impinge on 
liberty and suggest ways in which constitutional law, state law, and the 
public policy restraint on courts’ enforcement of private land-use 
restrictions could mitigate the problems. 
A. Liberty and Human Rights 
The most basic liberty is the right to be free from coercion over the 
control and use of one’s own body and self. To be subject to such 
coercion would be slavery, the most fundamental human rights 
violation.62 A free person owns herself in the sense that her actions are 
voluntary, and unless she wishes to donate her time and efforts, others 
must pay her for them. In that respect, the rights a free person enjoys 
over her own body and self are like property rights; they are rights that 
one may trade in the labor market for income. But they are more than 
simply property rights because they are fundamental to our dignity as 
human beings. They are intimately related to freedoms that are central to 
our unique identities such as freedoms of religion, speech, and 
association that enable us to hold and practice our own beliefs, speak our 
own minds, and indulge our own preferences in friends and associates. 
Almost no one in any developed society today disputes any of these 
freedoms,63 although the sad truth is that they are still being breached all 
 
 61.  See infra Part III.C. 
 62.  Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No one shall be held in 
slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.” G.A. Res. 
217A (III), at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 63.  Of course, slavery was one of the terrible ironies of early American history. Although the 
Declaration of Independence held that all men are created equal and endowed with inalienable 
rights, there were many slave owners in the Continental Congress that adopted it. See, e.g., PAUL 
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THOMAS 
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around the world.64 
One matter that has dogged scholars is whether a free person should 
be free to sell himself into slavery. The question can be rephrased as one 
about the scope of individuals’ rights in their own persons: Do they 
include the right of alienation? Most people seem to believe that they do 
not, and individuals’ rights in their own persons are inalienable under the 
laws of all civilized nations.65 The challenge is to provide a compelling 
justification. A restraint on the alienability of one’s rights in her person 
seems to place a limit on our most basic freedom since some people who 
might like to use the proceeds for the benefit of their families or others 
might actually be willing to sell themselves into slavery. If they are truly 
free, why should they not have the liberty to do so? Does a prohibition 
on their right to sell themselves into slavery not limit their most 
fundamental liberty? 
If liberty means the right to be free from coercion, then the answer 
is clearly yes. A State that enacted and enforced a law prohibiting its 
citizens from selling themselves into slavery would have used the power 
of State coercion to interfere with a private transaction. If the objective 
was to minimize the use of coercion in society overall, the State’s use of 
coercion to deter a private transaction would be counterproductive. Of 
course, there are other social values, reflected in constitutions, statutes, 
and court precedents, that constrain private transactions in many ways, 
but to the extent that they trump liberty, they should be subjected to the 
same careful scrutiny. If liberty were the sole criterion for evaluating 
social welfare, there would be no social value in any law, whether it was 
under a constitution, statute, or case precedent that prohibited people 
from selling themselves into slavery.66 But that does not mean the State 
should use its powers of coercion to enforce such a transaction. Once 
again, it is important to understand the distinction between the State 
 
JEFFERSON (2d ed. 2001). 
 64.  Unfortunately, the moral consensus against slavery has not ended human trafficking and 
the exploitation of children and adults through coercive labor practices. See, e.g., U.N. OFFICE ON 
DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, at 9, U.N. Sales No. E.13.IV.1 
(2012) (stating that more than twenty million people worldwide are victims of forced labor). 
 65.  The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the words: 
“Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members 
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” G.A. Res. 217A 
(III), at 71, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 66.  Some libertarian scholars have argued that liberty includes the freedom to alienate 
oneself into slavery. See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 21, at 331 (“The comparable question about an 
individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it 
would.”). Others have provided sophisticated arguments that it does not. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra 
note 9, at 77-82 (arguing that the right to one’s self is inalienable). 
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using its coercive powers to prohibit voluntary, private transactions and 
the State using its coercive powers to enforce private transactions. 
A constitutional constraint, statute, or case precedent prohibiting a 
private transaction would be suspect because it would use the State’s 
coercive powers to interfere with individuals’ liberty. But just because 
individuals might have the liberty to engage in a private transaction does 
not mean that the State’s coercive powers should be used to enforce it. 
Although it would be unjustified for the State to prohibit a voluntary 
private transaction in which an individual sold himself into slavery, it 
would arguably be even more unjustified for the State to use its coercive 
powers to enforce such a private transaction.67 If the social objective is 
to advance liberty, therefore, the State should not prohibit private 
transactions in which individuals sell themselves into slavery, but it 
should not enforce them either since there is no justification for the use 
of the State’s coercive powers to enforce a transaction that would result 
in someone losing their most fundamental liberty. If such transactions 
were legal but not enforceable, individuals would be able to enter into 
private agreements to serve as others’ slaves, but the agreements would 
not be legally binding. As a practical matter, this might destroy the 
incentives for anyone to buy a slave since the seller’s servitude would be 
entirely permissive and therefore terminable at the seller’s will, but it 
would still provide the greatest liberty possible.68 
B. Liberty and Private Property 
In theory, the State could protect its citizens from the use of 
coercion without protecting their claims to any property rights in chattels 
or land.69 Indeed, the enforcement of property rights by the State 
presents an obvious problem, since it requires the use of the State’s 
coercive powers on behalf of some individuals against others.70 Of 
 
 67.  Given the importance that almost everyone attaches to her liberty, it would be legitimate 
to ask whether anyone would voluntarily engage in such a transaction. But for the sake of the 
argument, it is best to set that matter aside. 
 68.  As a practical matter, although the argument here is different, it comes out close to the 
same place in the end as Randy Barnett’s. See BARNETT, supra note 9, at 81 (“while right-holders 
may exercise their inalienable rights consistent with the wishes of others, a right-holder may never 
surrender the right to change her mind in the future about whether to exercise such rights or not.”) 
(emphasis omitted). 
 69.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN supra note 32, at 38 (“A system of liberty may well give each person 
rights over his or her own person, but it does not in and of itself do much to assign ownership rights 
over things in the external world.”). 
 70.  See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 22 (“litigation . . . involves the threat of the use of 
public force against a recalcitrant defendant.”). 
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course, the State’s coercion would be exercised against only those 
individuals who infringed upon or challenged the property rights of 
others, and an individual’s liberty does not include the right to infringe 
upon other individuals’ rights.71 Of course, the use of coercion by the 
State could also be justified by consequentialist objectives such as 
increasing the freedoms of individuals to use and dispose of chattels, 
land, and intellectual property, and creating incentives for individuals to 
invent, innovate, and develop their property. Although the primary focus 
of this Article is on liberty, a well-defined system of property law 
provides the foundations for a productive and materially prosperous 
society and helps to free people from hunger and want.72 
The challenge, of course, is how to define the property rights that 
the government should enforce. It is helpful first to conceptualize the 
role of private law and its components—property, contract, and tort. 
Although these are separate areas of law, they are interrelated. Private 
law rests in a fundamental way on a system of property rights.73 Tort and 
contract laws help to define the scope of property rights, although the 
scope is also defined by the inherent powers of the State and any 
relevant governmental regulations.74 When a person acquires private 
property rights in chattels or land, those define her right to possess, use, 
and dispose of the chattels or land, as well as her rights to preclude 
others from exercising the same rights.75 Property rights can be quite 
nuanced. For example, a person can have the right to possess and use 
chattels, as well as the right to dispose of them by abandonment or gift, 
but not the right to dispose of them by sale; for another example, a 
person could have the right to possess a parcel of land and to use it for 
residential purposes, but not to use it for commercial or industrial 
purposes.76 
 
 71.  BARNETT, supra note 9, at 73 observes that “rights are relational” and that if individuals 
should “act in such a manner as to prevent others from using their rightfully owned resources then 
the purpose of having rights in the first place would be defeated.” 
 72.  Freyfogle, supra note 14, generally argues that most libertarian scholars ultimately 
depend on consequentialist arguments. Of course, some do so more explicitly than others. For 
example, EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 79 argues that property rules should be designed to maximize 
the total value of property holdings. However, HAYEK, supra note 7, at 61 sounded a warning about 
the limitations of consequentialist arguments. 
 73.  As a matter of logic, the right to make a claim against another for an injury to one’s 
person or property in tort presumes rights in one’s person or property, as does the right to alienate 
one’s rights in one’s person or property through a contract. 
 74.  See infra Part III.C. 
 75.  EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 79. 
 76.  Id. See also JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL 
H. SCHILL & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 102-03 (8th ed. 2014) for a discussion of the 
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When we say that someone owns something we merely mean that 
at present that person has the strongest property claim of anyone to that 
thing; we do not mean to imply that the person’s property claim is 
absolute and without qualification or that it is unlimited and will always 
necessarily remain the strongest.77 Moreover, there is nothing inherent in 
a regime of private property rights that necessarily involves the exercise 
of coercion, either by the State or the owners of private property. In 
matters of private law, the State exercises coercion only when it enforces 
private legal rights. If a person’s property claim is subject to a claim by 
another, and the person concedes ownership, then there will be no 
exercise of coercion by the State. If, however, a person is in possession 
of chattels when another challenges her property rights and she does not 
concede ownership, then the other person will have to petition a court to 
issue an injunction to force her to transfer possession of the chattels.78 
Even then, the court would only exercise the State’s coercive powers if it 
did issue the injunction. 
In fact, the property dispute would probably only arise at all if there 
was a disagreement about the assignment of property rights in the first 
place. Such a disagreement would normally arise only if there was some 
uncertainty about the relative strength of the parties’ property claims. If 
both parties knew with certainty that a court would side with the person 
in possession, the other party would have little, if any, incentive to go 
the expense of making the challenge.79 And if both parties knew with 
certainty that the challenger would win the contest, the person in 
possession would have little, if any, incentive to defend against the 
challenge.80 To the extent that any exercise of State coercion was 
necessary, therefore, it could generally be attributed to the uncertainty in 
the property laws that gave the parties an incentive to take their dispute 
to court. In that respect, liberty could be furthered by clarifying the 
property laws, but not by modifying them in any way that would make 
them more uncertain. 
There is an obvious tension, however, between pressures to 
 
“bundle of rights” theory of property. 
 77.  See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 126-27 for a discussion of the “relational” 
nature of property rights. 
 78.  The other person would seek an injunction under an action in replevin if the dispute were 
over the possession of chattels and an injunction under an action in ejectment if the dispute was over 
land. Id. at 128. 
 79.  This was an early insight from the law and economics literature. See generally William 
M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). 
 80.  See generally Landes, supra note 79; Posner, supra note 79. 
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improve the private laws and pressures to maintain stability and 
predictability.81 Once the basic parameters of an effective system of 
private laws have been established, an incremental approach to 
improvements may be most efficacious.82 Nonetheless, it would be a 
mistake to presume that stability and certainty should always prevail 
over the need for innovation and change. As society and technologies 
evolve, and as our understanding of the consequences and implications 
of the laws that we have grows, it may be possible to comprehend ways 
in which innovations in our private laws could not only help to advance 
liberty but also help to vindicate other social values.83 
It is important to anticipate that some of the political pressures for 
legal reforms may be antithetical to liberty. This is partly because in a 
democracy some groups will always try to use the levers of the State for 
self-serving and ill-conceived goals. Because a system of private 
property rights implies a distribution of wealth, there will also inevitably 
be pressures to use the levers of the State to redistribute property. 
Indeed, there is an important sense in which private property rights 
confer freedoms on some at the expense of others. Since private property 
rights typically include the right to exclude, they typically also limit the 
rights of others to use. When the State enforces private property rights, 
therefore, it uses its coercive powers to exclude non-owners from the use 
and enjoyment of the property. 
There are obviously compelling reasons for the State to protect 
private property rights, but it would be cavalier to disregard the potential 
for inequity.84 A society, for example, in which a small minority owned 
all of the property might be unjust.85 The majority might understandably 
feel that the State was a mere façade for the interests of the minority, 
 
 81.  HAYEK, supra note 7, at 231 acknowledged that “[t]here is ample scope for 
experimentation and improvement within . . . [the] . . . legal framework which makes it possible for 
a free society to operate most efficiently.” Yet, he also wrote that “[s]o far as possible, our aim 
should be to improve human institutions so as to increase the chances of correct foresight.” Id at 30. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Hayek observed that “the continuous growth of wealth and technological knowledge . . . 
will constantly suggest new ways in which government might render services to its citizens . . . .” 
Id. at 231. He also wrote of the “scope for . . . improvement within . . . [the] . . . legal framework 
which makes it possible for a free society to operate most efficiently.” Id. 
 84.  The consequentialist justifications often rest on maximizing the value of the property or 
maximizing utility. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 79. BARNETT supra note 9, at 64-72 
develops a natural rights justification. 
 85.  As a general matter, many libertarian scholars might disagree. NOZICK, supra note 21, at 
274-75 not only argues against the idea of redistribution but also predicts that it would ultimately 
benefit the middle-class. HAYEK, supra note 7, at 232 argues that efforts directed at redistribution 
ultimately undermine the order of an existing legal system and result in a command economy. 
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especially if the society offered little hope for the majority to acquire 
property of their own. The majority might become alienated from its 
government; in fact, one wonders whether the government could persist 
unless it used the power of State coercion to suppress dissent.86 
Some libertarians are opposed to redistribution altogether.87 It is not 
difficult to understand their concerns. Redistribution not only requires 
the use of State coercion, but it also encourages individuals to reallocate 
their time and efforts away from productive activities and towards 
political ones that will increase their share of the society’s material 
resources.88 Even the possibility that the State might engage in the 
redistribution of resources encourages unproductive investments of time 
and effort in politics. There is some logic, therefore, in strictly opposing 
redistribution. But while the logic is compelling, it would be a mistake 
to believe that it eliminates the need to address redistribution issues. 
To begin with, liberty is not the only factor to consider in the 
calculus of social welfare, and other social values might justify a use of 
the State’s coercive powers to redistribute resources.89 Moreover, if the 
State is going to protect liberty, it will need financing, and that means 
the need for tax revenues. Unfortunately, taxation inevitably raises 
redistribution issues.90 Finally, liberty can probably only thrive in a 
democracy,91 and in a democracy the weight of the electorate is likely to 
make redistribution an ongoing political issue.92 The most sensible 
response would be to devise redistribution policies that interfere with 
liberty as little as possible. That would be a Herculean task, and it cannot 
be undertaken here, but it is an issue that any full treatment of the 
relationship between liberty and private property will ultimately have to 
 
 86.  The hypothetical probably better describes a totalitarian State than any existing or 
historical democracy. Since a totalitarian State would be antithetical to liberty, its demise would be 
welcome. 
 87.  See, e.g., NOZICK, supra note 21, at 274-75; HAYEK, supra note 7, at 232. 
 88.  See, e.g., Robert D. Tollison, The Economic Theory of Rent Seeking, 152 PUBLIC CHOICE 
73, 74 (2012). 
 89.  There are, for example, people who are clearly unable to provide for themselves by dint 
of their physical or mental limitations. These include small children, adults who are severely 
disabled, and those who are mentally ill. 
 90.  Should the State be financed through a head tax? Even if a head tax was feasible, would it 
be fair, especially if some individuals received more protection from coercion and other government 
services than others? And what if some individuals could not afford to pay the tax? Since taxes 
themselves have redistributive effects, the need for taxes makes the need to address redistribution 
issues inevitable. 
 91.  For a classic argument, see CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE 
WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977). 
 92.  See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Director’s Law of Public Income Redistribution, 13 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1970). 
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address. 
1. First In Time, First In Right 
The most basic principle of property is that the first person to take 
possession of something acquires the strongest claim to it.93 This is the 
first in time, first in right rule. It has a strong intuitive appeal. Indeed, 
some scholars have justified it using natural rights arguments.94 
Regardless of the merits of those arguments, the first in time rule also 
seems to minimize the exercise of coercion. As a general matter, it 
implies that the first person to take possession of something will be 
protected by the State against others who might forcibly try to take 
possession from them.95 The first possessor would normally retain her 
possessory rights until she decided to transfer them voluntarily to 
someone else through a contract, gift, or devise.96 
The most obvious alternative to the first in time rule would be one 
that allowed the current possessor to have the strongest property claim 
even if the current possessor was not the first possessor. It seems 
reasonable to predict that, under the alternative rule, at least some 
individuals would devote their time and energy to trying to usurp 
possession (and thus property rights) from the first-possessors; the first-
possessors would then have to devote time and resources to retaining 
possession (and, thus, their property rights).97 Moreover, some 
individuals would probably be tempted to acquire possession from 
others coercively; thus, the State would probably have to exercise more 
coercion to police against the use of coercion, and the first-possessors 
would probably have to use more coercion against other individuals to 
retain possession. A rule that favored the current possessor would 
therefore probably increase the use of coercion by both individuals and 
the State. 
As every law student quickly learns, the concept of possession is 
 
 93.  This is the first principle of property that tens of thousands of law students have been 
taught. It is the rule that comes out of that case about the fox, Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 177-79 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 94.  See. e.g., BARNETT, supra note 9, at 68-71. 
 95.  Of course, the concept of possession is malleable. Under the doctrine of constructive 
possession a person may be deemed to have possession of something even without having dominion 
and control over it. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 32. 
 96.  Of course, in some cases, her rights might be terminated through eminent domain or 
subordinated by an adverse possessor or finder. See the discussion, infra Part III.B.3. 
 97.  The same logic could be applied to any alternative rule. It would always provide an 
incentive for individuals to acquire superior property rights to the first-possessor, and that would 
mean a waste of time and energy as well as a potential increase in the use of coercion. 
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slippery, and so, the first in time rule is malleable. The first person to 
acquire possession has the strongest claim to something, but possession 
may be constructive rather than actual.98 Moreover, because the legal 
definition of constructive possession is a muddy one, the doctrine gives 
courts considerable discretion in assigning initial property rights.99 For 
example, a court might apply the doctrine under circumstances when a 
person is merely in pursuit of something rather than in actual physical 
possession; however, the court would normally only apply the doctrine 
in such a case if the person in pursuit was highly likely under the 
circumstances to succeed in gaining actual physical possession, but this 
would still give the court considerable wiggle room.100 The doctrine can 
obviously be rationalized on other grounds, but it is at least a happy 
coincidence that it also helps to forestall the exercise of coercion by the 
person in pursuit against other persons that might intervene and take 
actual possession before the person in pursuit, and vice versa. 
2. Findings And Adverse Possession 
Other property rules, such as those for findings and adverse 
possessions, probably also minimize the exercise of coercion. Under the 
law of findings, for example, the finder of lost chattels usually has 
superior property rights against all except the owner.101 The findings rule 
protects the finder against coercive efforts that others might engage in to 
acquire possession from her, and it thus diminishes the incentives for 
others to engage in such coercion.102 Of course, courts would normally 
use their coercive powers to help an owner reclaim possession within 
some reasonable time of the finding. At some point, however, the statute 
of limitations on an action in replevin would normally preclude the 
original owner from using the courts to reclaim possession and the finder 
would become the de facto new owner.103 The same basic scheme of 
rules applies in adverse possession cases. An adverse possessor has a 
 
 98.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 32. 
 99.  Thus, the case about the whale, Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159, 161-62 (D. Mass. 1881), in which 
the beachcomber who first took physical possession of a whale was liable to the whaler who killed 
it. 
 100.  This is the logic of Barbeyrac’s rule, which states that a hunter in pursuit of a wild beast 
with “large dogs and hounds” has constructive possession whereas a hunter in pursuit merely with 
“beagles only” does not. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 181 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 101.  This is the rule of Armory v. Delamirie, (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B.). 
 102.  As in Armory v. Delamirie, in which the court prevented a jeweler from converting an 
item of jewelry found by a chimney sweep. Id. 
 103.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 143. 
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superior property claim against all except the owner.104 This has the 
virtue of protecting the adverse possessor from the use of coercion by 
others attempting to acquire possession from him, and it diminishes the 
incentives for others to engage in such coercion. The original owner is 
able to use the coercive powers of the courts to reclaim possession of the 
land until the statute of limitations on an action in ejectment runs out. At 
that point, the adverse possessor becomes the de facto new owner. 
One could argue that the rule for adverse possession actually gives 
individuals an incentive to use coercion to force owners off their lands 
so that they can then begin possessing adversely and eventually make an 
adverse possession claim. However, this use of coercion would be illegal 
under criminal laws, and statutes of limitations on actions in ejectment 
by owners against adverse possessors are generally more than long 
enough to give owners time to protect their property rights.105 Moreover, 
in some jurisdictions an adverse possession claim must be made in good 
faith, and a claim based on the forcible ejection of the owner would 
never succeed. It is not surprising, therefore, that adverse possession 
claims rarely, if ever, arise from adverse possessors’ use of coercion 
against owners. In fact, adverse possession claims most commonly arise 
for more innocuous reasons, such as boundary disputes and surveying 
errors, and both the adverse possessor and the owner are often surprised 
to find themselves in a legal dispute.106 
If the objective is to minimize the exercise of coercion, the only 
obvious way of improving the rules governing findings and adverse 
possession would be to make it clearer how the rules would apply. That 
would reduce the legal uncertainty that might require the exercise of 
coercion by the courts. For example, if it were crystal clear in a findings 
case exactly when the statute of limitations on an action in replevin 
would run out, there would hardly ever be any need for the original 
owner to take legal recourse to reclaim possession; the finder would be a 
fool to go to the expense and bother of trying to defend against the 
owner’s action before the statute of limitations had run out, and the 
original owner would be foolish to go to the expense of trying to reclaim 
possession after the statute of limitations had run out.107 
 
 104.  Id. at 144-45. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 163. 
 107.  See generally Landes, supra note 79; Posner, supra note 79. 
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3 .Eminent Domain 
An individual’s property rights are never absolute. Even if they are 
otherwise unregulated by either public or private restrictions, an 
individual’s property rights can still be condemned by the State through 
the power of eminent domain.108 In the United States, and most, if not 
all, democratic nations, the government’s power to take109 private 
property is constitutionally limited and, thus, regulated by the courts, but 
it does, nonetheless, provide an important, if controversial, limitation on 
private property rights.110 Whether it is constitutionally limited or not, 
therefore, the power of eminent domain helps to define the scope of an 
individual’s private property rights. 
For example, a person’s property rights in land are limited by the 
government’s constitutional right to take the land, subject to whatever 
compensation, if any, the government may be required to provide for the 
taking.111 In this respect, the government’s power to take the land is 
similar to the right of entry or power of termination that a grantor retains 
in land whenever the grantor conveys a fee simple subject to a condition 
subsequent to a grantee; although, in contrast to a taking by the 
government, the grantor is not normally required to pay any 
compensation after asserting a right of entry.112 Perhaps the biggest 
difference between the government’s power of eminent domain and a 
right of entry is that eminent domain gives the government the 
equivalent of a right of entry automatically and not because a grantor has 
elected to retain a right of entry in conveying property to a grantee.113 
The State’s power of eminent domain undermines liberty because it 
requires the use of the State’s coercive powers against an individual. 
That is inherently problematic because the powers of the State in any 
 
 108.  For a thorough overview of the topic, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 1107-
1266. 
 109.  In a democracy, the power of eminent domain is typically exercised by government 
officials on behalf of an elected executive or legislature; the reference to the “government’s powers 
to take” rather than the “State’s power to take” is intended to comport with that reality and common 
parlance. 
 110.  The fact that the State’s powers of eminent domain are regulated by the courts—a branch 
of government—is worth noting. In a State that had no real separation of powers, such that the 
judiciary was not truly independent of the executive branch, there would be no effective restraint on 
the scope of the government’s takings powers. See COOTER, supra note 24, at 225-34. 
 111.  Under the United States Constitution, “just compensation” is required. U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. 
 112.  For an overview of defeasible fee simples and the fee simple subject to a condition 
subsequent, see DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 244-74. 
 113.  Eminent domain limits private property rights automatically in the sense that it is not a 
limitation placed upon a property interest expressly at the time it is granted. 
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representative democracy might be wielded on behalf of a tyrannical 
majority, or even a disproportionately powerful minority. It is true, in the 
United States at least, that the State’s takings powers are constitutionally 
limited, and just compensation must be provided even when they are 
exercised. It is also true that the State’s takings powers have expanded 
significantly over the last several decades,114 and that just compensation 
is rarely, if ever, fully sufficient to compensate expropriated property 
owners fully for the subjective values that they place on the property that 
is taken.115 
Just compensation is generally inadequate because it is calculated 
using estimates of market values rather than the owners’ true subjective 
values. As every undergraduate student learns in an introductory 
microeconomics course, the market price in a well-functioning, 
competitive market (which is the usual assumption for real estate 
markets) reflects the marginal valuation of what is being sold—
intuitively, the marginal value of the last property of that type sold.116 
Almost all buyers in such a market, however, are infra-marginal, and 
they value the properties they buy more than the prices they pay for 
them.117 That is why a well-functioning, competitive market generates 
buyers’ (or, in the case of consumer goods, “consumer”) surplus. The 
surplus earned by any individual buyer is the difference between the 
value they place on whatever it is they are buying and the price they 
must pay to make the purchase.118 If a property owner is compensated 
for a taking in an amount exactly equal to the market price, therefore, 
she will lose all of the surplus value she enjoyed from her property.119 
This, no doubt, explains why most property owners are typically 
disgruntled when they are subjected to a taking. 
The United States Constitution expressly limits the government’s 
power of eminent domain to cases where the taking is for a public use.120 
The Supreme Court’s definition of a public use thus defines the scope of 
the government’s takings powers. It is not surprising, therefore, that the 
Supreme Court’s recent holdings expanding the definition of public use 
have caused so much controversy.121 Historically, the Court defined 
 
 114.  See infra notes 120-127 and accompanying text. 
 115.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 1127-29. 
 116.  Id. See also DAVID M. KREPS, MICROECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS I: CHOICE AND 
COMPETITIVE MARKETS (2013) for an introduction to microeconomic theory. 
 117.  KREPS, supra note 116, at 296-303. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 1127-29. 
 120.  Id. at 1129. 
 121.  See, in particular, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For a sample of the 
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public uses narrowly, essentially limiting the power of eminent domain 
to takings of land for uses that would make the land open to the public or 
provide it to private carriers who would make their transportation 
services open to the public.122 In a series of recent cases, however, the 
Supreme Court has gradually expanded the scope of permissible public 
uses, initially to include takings from some private owners to others for 
the purpose of redeveloping blighted neighborhoods, but more recently 
to include takings from some private owners to others for the purpose of 
redeveloping non-blighted neighborhoods as part of integrated 
redevelopment plans.123 
Takings for public uses that involve making the land open to the 
public or providing it to public carriers who will make their services 
open to the public may be justified as necessary to provide public 
goods.124 If there are strong enough public good justifications for a 
taking, those might be sufficient to justify the exercise of State coercion 
against private property owners.125 But if the government’s takings 
power is exercised to reallocate properties from some private owners to 
others simply for the purpose of encouraging economic development in 
non-blighted neighborhoods, that is another matter. Opening the door to 
the use of State coercion against some individuals for the benefit of 
others opens the door to an abuse of the State’s powers by those who are 
the most wealthy and influential against those who are the least wealthy 
and influential.126 The State could thus serve as an instrument for exactly 
 
immediate critical reactions to Kelo, see the following: Orlando E. Delogu, Kelo v. City of New 
London—Wrongly Decided and a Missed Opportunity for Principled Line Drawing with Respect to 
Eminent Domain Takings, 58 ME. L. REV. 17 (2006); Sonya D. Jones, Note and Comment, That 
Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land . . . Until the Local Government Can Turn It for a Profit: 
A Critical Analysis of Kelo v. City of New London, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 139 (2005); and Charles E. 
Cohen, Eminent Domain after Kelo v. City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic 
Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491 (2006). 
 122.  Justice O’Connor provided a useful overview of the historical development of the public 
use requirement in her dissenting opinion in Kelo. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496-504 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting). 
 123.  Id. at 519. See also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 231 (1984). 
 124.  Pure public goods are characterized by the impossibility of excluding anyone from 
consuming them and their inexhaustible availability for consumption by everyone once they have 
been provided. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 45-46 (5th ed. 2008). 
Obviously, pure public goods are extremely rare, but some goods have enough of their 
characteristics to come close, and it is those ones to which the term “public goods” typically refers. 
 125.  This concurs with Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Kelo. 545 U.S. at 496-504 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 126.  As Justice O’Connor explained, “[T]he fallout from this decision will not be random. The 
beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the 
political process, including large corporations and development firms. As for the victims, the 
government now has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with 
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the kind of coercion that it is supposed to prevent. If liberty is the 
cornerstone of a just society, the power of eminent domain should be 
confined to cases where it is essential to the provision of public goods.127 
C. Private Land-Use Restrictions 
Land uses may be restricted under public laws, usually local land-
use ordinances, or private laws, usually private servitudes.128 The 
servitudes in most new residential developments are established in a 
document detailing the “Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions,” or the 
CC&Rs as they are commonly known.129 In most common interest 
communities, the CC&Rs provide for the establishment and operation of 
a Home Owners’ Association, or HOA, which is typically organized as a 
non-profit corporation and governed by an elected Board of Directors.130 
The Board of Directors’ duties typically include the responsibility for the 
enforcement of the CC&Rs.131 The CC&Rs typically also outline a 
process that can be used to amend the CC&Rs; this process typically 
requires homeowners to vote to approve the proposed amendments.132 
Since many of the services provided by the HOA under the CC&Rs 
are similar to services provided by a local government, and since the 
HOA itself is governed by electoral processes that are similar to those 
through which local government officials are elected, private land-use 
restrictions are analogous to public land-use restrictions in many 
ways.133 There is, however, an important difference. Local governments’ 
 
more.” Id. at 505. 
 127.  This would make the definition of a public good central to the scope of the government’s 
takings powers, and since the definition of a public good is somewhat nebulous, that would, to some 
extent, simply change the focus of the debate. But the traditional public uses much more to clearly 
satisfy the public good requirement than controversial redevelopment plans such as those in Kelo. 
 128.  For an introduction to private land-use restrictions, see GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE 
LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS, REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES (2d ed. 
2004). 
 129.  For an overview of modern residential real estate developments, see Wayne S. Hyatt, 
Common Interest Communities: Evolution and Reinvention,  31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303 (1998). 
 130.  For a comprehensive treatment of the governance issues in common interest 
communities, see ADRIENNE SCHMITZ ET AL., RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT HANDBOOK 185-210 
(3d ed. 2004). 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  For a sample of the commentary, see Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private 
Communities or Public Governments: “The State Will Make the Call”, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 509, 
521 (1996); David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of 
Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 763 (1995); Shirley L. Mays, 
Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion in the Body Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 57 
(1995); and ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY 
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land-use ordinances are subject to the full panoply of constitutional 
constraints; however, as a general matter, private land-use restrictions 
are not.134 
If a city government enacts an ordinance that impinges on a 
property owner’s First Amendment rights, for example, by forbidding 
the owner from posting any signs supporting candidates for political 
office during an election, the courts will declare the ordinance 
unconstitutional and decline to enforce it.135 Or, if the government enacts 
an ordinance that establishes an architectural board and empowers it to 
approve or deny any architectural modifications to structures in the 
neighborhood using such vague guidelines that no one can understand 
them or predict how they will apply, the courts will strike the ordinance 
on the grounds of being unconstitutionally vague.136 In each of these 
cases, the State’s exercise of coercion (through the underlying threat of 
penalties for any property owner who posts a political sign or modifies 
her property’s architecture without the required approval) would be 
constrained by the United States Constitution or a state constitution. 
Thus, the property owners’ sphere of personal autonomy and privacy 
would be protected and liberty would be advanced. 
As a general matter, however, constitutional constraints do not 
apply to private land-use restrictions, such as the CC&Rs in a modern 
residential property development.137 Thus, if the CC&Rs in a residential 
development forbid a property owner from posting political signs, the 
Board of Directors of the HOA may order her not to do so and even 
impose financial penalties on her if she fails to comply.138 And if the 
CC&Rs establish architectural guidelines and require the approval of an 
architectural review board for any modifications to the exterior of a 
 
ASSOCIATIONS IN AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 62 (1992). 
 134.  For an early argument, however, that HOAs should be subject to constitutional 
constraints see Katharine Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State Constitutions to 
Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 30 
(1984). 
 135.  See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994). 
 136.  See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Issaquah, 851 P.2d 744, 746 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
 137.  For an extended analysis that corroborates that conclusion, see Lisa J. Chadderdon, Note, 
No Political Speech Allowed: Common Interest Developments, Homeowners Associations, and 
Restrictions on Free Speech, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 233 (2006). For arguments that 
constitutional constraints should apply to CC&Rs, see Rosenberry, supra note 134; John C. Toews, 
Comment, Validity Rules Concerning Public Zoning and Private Covenants: A Comparison and 
Critique, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 409 (1966); and Mark Urban, Comment, An Evaluation of the 
Applicability of Zoning Principles to the Law of Private Land Use Restrictions, 21 UCLA L. REV. 
1655 (1974). 
 138.  EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCATIONS AND THE RISE OF 
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 21 (1994). 
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house, the board’s decisions will generally be enforceable regardless of 
whether the guidelines are vague.139 
An HOA and its governance structures are established under private 
law, and even though HOAs have begun to assume some of the 
responsibilities of local governments and increasingly appear to operate 
as if they were private governments, as private entities they are generally 
beyond the reach of any constitutional constraints.140 This is problematic 
because ultimately, if they are to have any teeth, the CC&Rs that an 
HOA enforces must be enforceable in the courts. It would be pointless, 
for example, for an HOA to levy assessments (in other words, impose 
financial penalties) against a homeowner for failing to comply with the 
CC&Rs unless the HOA could gain the assistance of the courts in 
enforcing the assessments.141 The State is thus ultimately complicit in 
the enforcement of private land-use restrictions. What if the CC&Rs go 
too far? What if they regulate a homeowner’s land uses in ways that a 
local government could not? More importantly, what if they intrude into 
the spheres of personal autonomy and privacy that are essential to 
individuals’ liberty? 
Under the State action doctrine, constraints against government in 
the United States and state constitutions usually apply only to State 
actors, and in enforcing private laws, courts have not generally been 
treated as State actors.142 There is, of course, one well-known exception. 
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the United States Supreme Court held that any 
court that enforced racially restrictive covenants would violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.143 The Supreme Court, 
in effect, treated the judicial branch as a State actor in the enforcement 
of the racially restrictive covenants even though the covenants were 
created under private law.144 This expanded the scope of State action 
 
 139.  Toews, supra note 137, at 412; Urban, supra note 137, at 1679-80. 
 140.  See generally MCKENZIE, supra note 138. There are exceptions. In some cases, state 
constitutional constraints might apply to private actors because State action is not required. See, e.g., 
Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n., 29 P.3d 797, 827 (Cal. 2001) (Werdegar, 
J., dissenting) (construing free speech protections under the California Constitution). Moreover, 
HOAs may also be constrained by federal or state statutes. See, e.g., Amin v. 5757 N. Sheridan Rd. 
Condo Ass’n., No. 12 CV 446, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67930, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2012) 
(quoting the Illinois Condominium Act, which states that HOAs may not make any rules impairing 
free exercise of religion rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution or the Illinois 
Constitution). See also 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/18.4(h) (Westlaw through P.A. 99-140 
2015). 
 141.  See, e.g., SCHMITZ ET AL., supra note 130. 
 142.  See the discussion supra Part II. 
 143.  334 U.S. 1, 8-23 (1948). 
 144.  As Justice Vinson wrote in the majority opinion, “We have no doubt that there has been 
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under the State action doctrine, and, at least in theory, opened the door to 
a much wider range of constitutional constraints on the use of the courts 
to enforce private land-use restrictions. In practice, however, the State 
action doctrine continues to be applied narrowly;145 Shelley v. Kramer is 
a clear outlier and has been widely criticized—not for the outcome in the 
case, because hardly anyone would want racially restrictive covenants to 
be enforceable, but for creating a glaring inconsistency in the case law 
and confounding the State action doctrine.146 It may be regrettable, but it 
is perhaps not surprising that courts have generally declined to extend 
the Shelley precedent to other private law cases.147 There is no logical 
reason, however, why the judicial branch of government should be 
treated differently than the legislative or executive branches or why the 
use of State coercion to enforce private legal rights is any different than 
its use to enforce public laws.148 
Some scholars have tried to justify strict enforcement of private 
land-use restrictions using a freedom of contract argument that 
individuals impliedly consent to the exercise of State coercion against 
them when they assume private legal obligations under contracts with 
other individuals.149 Since private land-use restrictions are created 
voluntarily, and since the parties who create them, or become owners of 
land bound by them, may be presumed to have impliedly consented to 
the restrictions, some might argue that courts’ failure to enforce them 
would undermine the autonomy and will of the parties who created 
them.150 That is a compelling argument that justifies the use of State 
coercion to enforce most private legal obligations. But it does not justify 
judicial enforcements of private legal obligations that would undermine 
individuals’ liberty.151 Many scholars concur that agreements alienating 
 
[S]tate action . . . in the full and complete sense of the phrase.” Id. at 19. 
 145.  Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 527-31. 
 146.  See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 29 (1959); Choper, supra note 43, at 769-71; and George Rutherglen, The Improbable 
History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused and Confused, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 329 (2003). 
 147.  Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 527-31. 
 148.  That does not mean, of course, that there are no legal reasons. The State action doctrine 
has created an important legal difference between actions of the judicial branch and actions of the 
executive and legislative branches. 
 149.  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 9, at 53-57, who defines principles of “consensual 
transfer,” and Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1368 (1981), who argues that we should accept the basic proposition that 
contract terms shall be binding on the original parties who create them and on all third parties who 
take with notice of the terms. 
 150.  Epstein, supra note 149. 
 151.  BARNETT, supra note 9, at 77-82, discusses reasons for constraining “consensual 
freedom” and concludes that not all rights are necessarily alienable. Epstein, supra note 149, at 
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certain liberties should not be enforceable by the State.152 For example, 
would we want courts to enforce an agreement under which one 
individual or group of individuals paid another individual or group of 
individuals not to vote? Would we want courts to enforce a private land-
use restriction that allowed homeowners to post signs in favor of 
Republican candidates, but not Democratic ones? 
These may seem like contrived examples since they involve 
particularly important liberties that have far-reaching social and political 
implications. But if anyone is going to argue that the courts should 
enforce private agreements alienating other liberties even though the 
other liberties are also constitutionally protected against government 
intrusions, they should be prepared to explain where we are to draw the 
line between liberties that are fully alienable and those that are not.153 
The line may be deceptively difficult to draw. For example, should 
courts enforce an agreement under which an individual gives another 
individual consideration in return for not posting any political signs 
during an election?154 If not, why should courts enforce a private land-
use restriction that forbids a homeowner from posting political signs 
during an election, especially if it has been established that they would 
not enforce a city ordinance that forbid the homeowner from posting 
such signs?155 Individuals would presumably receive an accommodation 
in the price of the home for knowingly accepting it with either public or 
private restrictions on such signs, so why treat the cases differently? And 
if the courts decline to enforce the legislature’s sign restrictions, why 
should they enforce an HOA’s? 
The freedom of contract argument ignores the third parties whose 
liberty might be diminished by the enforcement of private land-use 
restrictions. Private land-use restrictions convey with the land from the 
parties who created them to their successors in interest.156 Thus, the land 
 
1368 takes a stronger position in favor of free alienability, but also acknowledges limitations. 
 152.  See BARNETT, supra note 9; Epstein, supra note 149. 
 153.  BARNETT, supra note 9, at 77-82 argues that certain liberties are inherently inalienable, 
but his purpose is different, and he does not seek to address this question. 
 154.  See, Alan E. Garfield, Promises of Silence: Contract Law and Freedom of Speech, 83 
CORNELL L. REV. 261, 344-45 (1998) for a discussion of the nuances. Professor Garfield observes 
that the issues have not been widely addressed, but argues that courts should generally refrain from 
using their powers to suppress speech. 
 155.  Nuisance considerations might justify some government restrictions on speech rights but 
it is not clear why they should justify allowing more restrictions under private law than under public 
law. 
 156.  To be more precise, real covenants have been said to convey with estates in land; 
equitable servitudes have been said to attach to the land directly. This, however, is a technical 
distinction of fading relevance. 
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can end up being owned by someone who never particularly cared about 
the restrictions and might even find them obnoxious. To the extent that 
the restrictions remain enforceable after the land is conveyed by the 
parties who created them, they may continue to restrict land uses when 
virtually all landowners find them objectionable. Moreover, they would 
continue to apply against prospective buyers who had no say in their 
creation. In that respect, State coercion would inevitably be used against 
individuals without their implied consent.157 
The constitutional constraints on State action reflect important 
social values and protect fundamental individual liberties, and there is no 
logical reason why those constraints should not apply to the judicial 
branch’s enforcement of private laws just as they apply to acts of the 
executive or legislative branches. But that does not necessarily mean that 
the constraints should or have to apply as a matter of constitutional law. 
In fact, the issue is probably moot, because under the State action 
doctrine judicial enforcements of private laws are generally not 
considered State acts, and the scope of the State action doctrine is not 
likely to be expanded anytime soon.158 But there are other ways in which 
the important social values that underlie constitutional constraints 
against the State can be respected. 
Shelley v. Kraemer was an easy case. A racially restrictive covenant 
would generally be invoked only if a homeowner attempted to sell his 
property to someone who was a member of a race to whom alienation 
was forbidden.159 Both the homeowner and the prospective buyer would 
want to engage in the transaction; the opposition would come from other 
homeowners in the neighborhood who wanted to prevent a member of 
the prospective buyer’s race from living in their neighborhood. If a court 
enforced the restriction it would be using the State’s coercive powers to 
frustrate the wishes of the buyer and seller.160 The idea that an individual 
(the prospective buyer) could be compelled to pay taxes that help to 
finance the exercise of coercion against herself when there is no 
plausible way in which she could obtain any reciprocal freedom from the 
coercion of others (or any other benefits, except perhaps the courts’ 
assistance in discriminating against others) is troublesome. In the final 
 
 157.  It would strain the meaning of consent, for example, to suggest that the Shelleys 
“consented” to the racially restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer. 
 158.  Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 507-13. 
 159.  Of course, this is exactly what happened in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1948). 
 160.  Presumably the seller, who must have either created the restriction or purchased the land 
subject to the restriction, would no longer wish to be bound by it. If courts held that the seller should 
not be bound by his initial consent to the restrictions, then the restrictions would effectively be 
inalienable. BARNETT, supra note 9, at 81. 
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analysis, if a court enforced a racially restrictive covenant it would, in 
effect, be serving as the instrumentality for the racist neighbors’ exercise 
of coercion against the prospective buyer. 
Many other private land-use restrictions raise similar policy 
considerations. Suppose, for example, that a private restriction prohibits 
homeowners from posting signs in favor of candidates for political 
office.161 The United States Supreme Court has declared similar public 
land-use restrictions unconstitutional on the grounds that they violate the 
First Amendment.162 Those rulings advance liberty, of course, because it 
would be inappropriate to allow a local government to use its coercive 
powers to suppress homeowners’ First Amendment rights. If a court 
enforced a private land-use restriction prohibiting the same political 
signs it would be using the State’s coercive powers to suppress 
homeowners’ speech no less than if the restriction arose from a public 
land-use restriction. In fact, the case might be even more problematic 
than one involving a public restriction since the State might be expected 
to enforce a public restriction more consistently and uniformly than a 
relatively small group of neighbors acting through their HOA in a 
residential development. For example, if all the neighbors were 
Republican, they might not enforce the restriction against a homeowner 
who posted a sign supporting a Republican candidate, even though they 
would enforce the restriction against a homeowner who posted a sign 
supporting a Democratic candidate. 
For another example, consider a case in which an HOA adopts a 
new restriction that prohibits religious gatherings in a common room, 
but continues to allow non-religious gatherings.163 To be more specific, 
 
 161.  This is hardly just a hypothetical question. Courts in several cases have rejected free 
speech arguments and upheld private land-use restrictions against signs. See, e.g., Tansey-Warner, 
Inc. v. E. Coast Resorts, Inc., 1978 Del. Ch. LEXIS 688, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1978) (sign 
prohibition in condo did not violate free speech rights); Knolls Ass’n. v. Hinton, 389 N.E.2d 693, 
697 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (enforcing a sign prohibition); Murphy v. Timber Trace Ass’n., 779 S.W.2d 
603, 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting a free speech challenge against restriction on for sale 
signs); and Harrison v. Tucker, 342 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961) (enforcing sign 
prohibition but dissolving racially restrictive covenants). In states that do not require State action to 
trigger free speech rights, however, courts may decline to enforce of CC&Rs restricting signs, and 
they have done so in at least one case. See, e.g., Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n. v. 
Khan, 46 A.3d 507, 522 (N.J. 2012). 
 162.  See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994). 
 163.  This is not a hypothetical question either. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, Religion-Free 
Environments in Common Interest Communities, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 57, 57-59 (2010). As Professor 
Carmella explains, both the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development interpret religion-free environments to be in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 
but the only court to have considered the matter did not. See Savanna Club Worship Serv. v. 
Savanna Club Homeowners’ Ass’n., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (religious-free 
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suppose the restriction prevents a Christian prayer group from meeting, 
but allows a yoga club to meet and engage in meditation. If a public 
ordinance prohibited a religious group from gathering to pray in a public 
park, but allowed another group to meet and engage in meditation in the 
same place, it would violate the freedom of religion clause in the First 
Amendment.164 It would also clearly undermine liberty, since the State’s 
coercive powers would be used to prevent a group from praying while 
allowing another group to engage in meditation, a very similar activity. 
If a court enforced a private land-use restriction against religious groups 
meeting to pray in the common area of a residential development but 
allowed other groups to use the area for meditation, it would be using the 
State’s coercive powers to suppress religious freedom just as much as it 
would if it was enforcing a public ordinance. 
If liberty is to provide the compass governing the use of State 
power, then courts should be restrained in the enforcement of private 
land-use restrictions in all the ways that government is restrained in 
enforcing public land-use restrictions. In other words, all of the 
constitutional constraints that apply against public land-use restrictions 
should also apply against courts’ enforcement of private land-use 
restrictions. In an ideal world, the constraints would be applied under a 
more liberal application of the State action doctrine, one that recognized 
the judiciary as a branch of government and the courts as State actors.165 
Since constitutional doctrines evolve slowly, that is unlikely to happen 
anytime soon. It might be more efficacious for legislatures to apply all 
federal and state constitutional constraints to private land-use restrictions 
as a matter of statutory law, although that is not likely to happen anytime 
soon either.166 Ultimately, if legislatures fail to act, courts should apply 
 
common space was not discriminatory since all religions were treated the same). 
 164.  See JOHN B. ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 654-55 (4th ed. 2012).  See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) (a public 
university cannot exclude student religious groups from access to university facilities if it provide 
such access to other student groups). 
 165.  Not all critics of private land-use restrictions against religious gatherings agree that this 
would be the best approach. Carmella, supra note 163, at 95-98, for example, worries that 
constitutional norms might actually undermine the rights of religious groups to use common areas in 
common interest communities. The concern here is neither to promote nor suppress the rights of 
religious groups but to advance liberty. Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer’s Fiftieth 
Anniversary: “A Time for Keeping; a Time for Throwing Away?”, 47 KAN. L. REV. 61, 64-65 
(1998) opposes applying the State action doctrine in private law cases on the grounds that it might 
actually undermine liberty. She worries, for example, that residents may not be able to enforce 
restrictions against an adult book store because it would be protected by the First Amendment. 
 166.  Some states have already applied some particular constitutional protections through state 
statutes. Nonetheless, they have not done so coherently and pervasively and they are not likely to do 
so anytime soon. See Amanda Hopkins, Article, What’s Wrong with My Nativity Scene?: 
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the constraints themselves through new holdings that make private land-
use restrictions unenforceable as a matter of public policy whenever they 
would be unconstitutional as public land-use restrictions.167 
IV. LIBERTY OF CONTRACT 
This section focuses on the relationships between liberty and 
specific contract law doctrine. It uses examples from the parol evidence 
rule, the unconscionability doctrine, and the impracticability doctrine to 
illustrate the ways in which contract doctrines may advance or 
undermine liberty, depending on whether the doctrines are appropriately 
constructed and applied. It also raises concerns about the ways in which 
contract law may systematically undermine liberty, using as an example 
the practices of some State-sponsored, non-profit corporations that use 
lifestyle covenants and morals clauses in their employment contracts to 
intrude into their employees’ spheres of personal autonomy and privacy. 
Corporations may require employees to sign lifestyle covenants or 
morals clauses as a condition of employment; they may subsequently 
discharge the employees for violating the covenants or clauses. Since the 
lifestyle covenants and morals clauses may intrude into the employees’ 
spheres of personal autonomy and privacy, the fear or fact of being 
discharged for violating a lifestyle covenant or morals clause might 
impinge on the employees’ liberty. Moreover, prospective employees 
might be excluded from a significant segment of the labor market if they 
cannot, in conscience, sign a lifestyle covenant or morals clause that is 
inconsistent with their own lifestyle and values. 
Since the rights and privileges accorded to corporations by the State 
no doubt contribute to their economic success and power in labor 
markets, the State is complicit in the intrusion into the liberty of their 
employees and prospective employees.168 The State’s complicity is the 
greatest when the employer is a non-profit corporation because non-
profit corporations receive significantly more rights and privileges from 
the State than for-profit corporations and because they are not 
disciplined as rigorously by market competition.169 
This Article argues, therefore, that 1) subject to an appropriately 
 
Religiously Discriminatory Restrictive Covenants in New York, 13 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 415, 
421-22 (2012). 
 167.  Carmella, supra note 163, at 103-09 endorses courts’ use of public policy to void 
restrictions against religious gatherings. Saxer, supra note 165, at 70 also supports the public policy 
approach. 
 168.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 169.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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defined ministerial exception,170 non-profit corporations that benefit 
from significant tax exemptions should be prohibited under federal and 
state tax laws and/or regulations from requiring or even requesting 
employees to sign lifestyle covenants or morals clauses, 2) any 
employees they discharge for lifestyle or personal moral choices should 
be able to seek a remedy against them under state wrongful-discharge 
statutes, or 3) if the remedy is not provided under state statutes, it should 
be provided through the courts’ expansion in the scope of the public 
policy exception to the employment-at-will rule in employment law.171 
Part IV.A will discuss the freedom of contract and Part IV.B will 
discuss some of the limitations to this freedom, focusing on the parol 
evidence rule, the unconscionability doctrine, and the impracticability 
doctrine. Finally, Part IV.C will discuss the ways in which the use of 
lifestyle clauses and morals clauses by some State-sponsored, non-profit 
corporations in their employment contracts intrudes into their 
employees’ spheres of personal autonomy and privacy and it suggests 
ways in which the problems could be mitigated through federal and state 
statutes, as well through court decisions which expand the scope of 
wrongful-discharge laws. 
A. The Freedom of Contract 
The term “freedom of contract”—or “liberty of contract”—is often 
associated with an argument that the government’s right to regulate 
private markets is or should be constrained by the due process clause of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.172 But the term 
is also often used in a more general sense to refer to the respect for the 
autonomy of the parties to a contract to decide for themselves what the 
rules governing their agreement should be.173 Scholars have sometimes 
used this broader meaning of the term in critiquing contract doctrines or 
courts’ contract decisions that they believe frustrate the intentions of the 
 
 170.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 171.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 172.  See, e.g., DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 1-2 (2011). 
 173.  HAYEK, supra note 7, at 230-31, BARNETT, supra note 9, at 77-82, and Epstein, supra 
note 149, at 1354, 1368. This is, in fact, a basic principle of contract law in the United States and 
most other developed nations. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302 (1977) (Variation by Agreement section of 
the Uniform Commercial Code); U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNITED 
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, at 3, U.N. Sales 
No. E.10.V.14 (Article 6 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale 
of Goods states: “The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or, subject to article 
12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”). 
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parties and, in effect, alter the terms of the parties’ agreements.174 
There are often excellent reasons to raise concerns about 
government regulations in private markets, but the main purpose of this 
section is to focus on the role that State coercion plays in enforcing 
private contractual obligations. Since courts exercise coercion whenever 
they enforce contractual obligations, this raises the question: Why 
should they do so? The best answer is that the parties impliedly agree to 
subject themselves to that form of State coercion when they execute 
their contract.175 In other words, it is their intention and will to bind 
themselves to their agreement by deferring to the State’s authority to use 
its coercive powers to enforce the terms, should enforcement be 
necessary.176 By binding themselves to their agreement, the parties are 
able to enjoy even greater freedom, since they can thus trade their 
private property and other rights in return for private property and rights 
of others that are of greater value to them.177 
There is considerable commentary and debate about the ways in 
which some courts have construed and applied contract doctrines. One 
common concern, particularly among scholars who take a formalist 
approach to contracts, is that overly broad or loose interpretations of 
some contract doctrines might frustrate the intentions of the parties to an 
agreement; another concern is that it might increase the transaction costs 
of contracting parties regardless of whether they ever have any kind of 
dispute.178 In keeping with the focus of the Article, this Part focuses 
instead on the ways in which some important contract doctrines may 
advance or impede liberty. As the discussion below will elaborate, the 
matter may be somewhat nuanced.179 
 
 174.  EPSTEIN, supra note 36, at 120-21 describes this view as the classical synthesis. 
Interestingly, HAYEK, supra note 7, at 230-31 argues that the issue is not what contracts the State 
will allow, but which ones they will enforce. 
 175.  See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 9, at 53-57 for Randy Barnett’s discussion of consensual 
transfers. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  As Friedrich Hayek observed, “The rules of property and contract are required to delimit 
the individual’s private sphere wherever the resources or services needed for the pursuit of his aims 
are scarce and must, in consequence, be under the control of some man or other.” HAYEK, supra 
note 7, at 141. 
 178.  This is standard transaction cost analysis: legal uncertainty encourages parties to draft 
their agreements more carefully than they otherwise would. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 124, 
at 195-244. 
 179.  Interestingly, Friedrich Hayek had few quibbles with contract doctrines. In fact, his 
conception of freedom of contract was not the one that is meant today. As he wrote; “Freedom of 
contract, like freedom in all other fields, really means that the permissibility of a particular act 
depends only on general rules and not on its specific approval by authority.” HAYEK, supra note 7, 
at 230. 
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B. The Limits of The Freedom of Contract 
1. The Parol Evidence Rule 
Most contract disputes raise questions about the appropriate 
interpretation of the contract terms.180 Disputes about contract 
interpretation often raise questions about what evidence a court will 
consider in interpreting the contract.181 Some scholars have argued that 
when the parties are sophisticated and use a written instrument that 
includes a merger clause to provide evidence of a carefully negotiated 
and drafted agreement, courts should apply the parol evidence rule 
strictly and rely on the plain meaning of the writing to interpret the 
contract’s terms.182 Since it arrives at a formalist prescription using 
modern neoclassical economic analysis, this line of scholarship 
constitutes a neo-formalist movement in modern contract scholarship.183 
Within the sphere of its application, the logic is beyond dispute. What is 
not beyond dispute, however, is whether the analysis is at all novel or 
surprising and whether it applies as widely as the authors contend, or 
even widely enough to be of any practical value.184 
Indeed, the normative implications of the neo-formalist analysis are 
predictable consequences of its neoclassical economic assumptions. 
Given that the analysis is predicated on a model of two perfectly rational 
parties, endowed with the computational abilities of high speed 
computers and the wisdom of Job, the implication that courts should 
respect and enforce their mutual intentions about the scope of the 
evidence that might be used to interpret their contract is hardly 
surprising. In fact, the main part of the analysis was anticipated by Eric 
 
 180.  George Cohen, Interpretation and Implied Terms in Contract Law, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
CONTRACT LAW AND ECONOMICS 125, 125-26 (Gerrit de Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011). 
 181.  As Margaret Kniffin clarifies, questions about contract interpretation and the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence are often conflated, but they are distinct. Margaret N. Kniffin, 
Conflating and Confusing Contract Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule: Is the Emperor 
Wearing Someone Else’s Clothes?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 75, 76-77 (2009). 
 182.  See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003); Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, The Law and Economics of Costly 
Contracting, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2004); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating 
Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006); Jody Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009); and Alan Schwartz 
& Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010). 
 183.  Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott describe the work as part of a larger project, “arguing 
that the law should pursue the first order goal of maximizing contractual surplus when it chooses 
rules to regulate merchant-to-merchant contracts.” Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract 
Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 928 (2010). 
 184.  See generally STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION (2009). 
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Posner well before the neo-formalists addressed the matter.185 Moreover, 
one could argue that some of the claims about the normative 
implications are clearly overreaching. For example, Robert Scott and 
Alan Schwartz’s analysis is intended to apply only to “sophisticated” 
parties, but their definition of a “sophisticated” party is any corporation 
that has five or more employees.186 It seems highly doubtful whether 
even the largest corporations ever engage in the kind of sophisticated 
strategizing and contract drafting that is assumed in their analysis or 
would have anything close to the computation abilities and foresight 
they would need in order to do so.187 
As a practical matter, the terms of any contract, whether it covers a 
complex long-term business relationship or a simple one-shot 
transaction, must be negotiated and agreed upon using a language of 
some kind. Unfortunately, there are inherent limitations on the use of 
language. First of all, as Wittgenstein observed, there can be no such 
thing as a “private” language.188 That is to say, a language must be 
shared; it cannot consist of symbols, signs, or sounds that have only 
personal meanings, or meanings to only the person who uses them.189 A 
language is therefore necessarily “public” in the sense that its meanings 
must be shared for the language to qualify as a medium of 
communication. Unfortunately, because the meanings of any language 
are also inherently personal they cannot be understood in precisely the 
same way by different people. The meanings must be “shared”, but they 
can only be shared imperfectly since we can never be certain that they 
are understood by all persons in exactly the same way.190 In fact, it is not 
even certain that the understandings people have of the language they 
use at one time will be the same as their understandings—or even their 
 
 185.  See generally Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the 
Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998). 
 186.  Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 
YALE L.J. 541, 545 (2003). 
 187.  HAYEK, supra note 7, at 56-61 went to great lengths to reject the “French rationalist 
tradition” of rooting economic theory in assumptions about perfectly rational behavior in favor of 
the “British empirical tradition.” He believed the latter was closer to the “Christian tradition of the 
fallibility and sinfulness of man.” Id. at 61. In that respect, his views accorded with those of the 
modern day new institutional economists. See, e.g., Rudolph Richter, The Role of Law in the New 
Institutional Economics, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13, 15 (2008) (“[T]he NIE from its very 
beginnings proceeded . . . by taking account of the imperfections of individual rationality and 
limited foresight.”). 
 188.  Val D. Ricks, The Possibility of Plain Meaning: Wittgenstein and the Contract 
Precedents, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 767, 785 (2008). 
 189.  Id. at 785-88. 
 190.  Public language cannot reflect the parties’ private thoughts. Id. at 789. 
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recollection of their understandings—of the same language later on.191 
Unfortunately, the interpretation of contractual rights and 
obligations is subject to the limitations of the language that is used to 
express them. Moreover, the need for interpretation implies the need for 
an “interpreter.”192 If the parties have a dispute about the interpretation 
of the language of their agreement, then they obviously cannot agree on 
an appropriate interpretation. And if only one of the parties is assigned 
the right to interpret the language so that there is no need for them to 
agree on its interpretation, that party will apply its own understanding of 
the language as of that time, rather than any shared understanding 
between the parties at the time of contracting. For practical purposes, the 
“language” of the contract would be a private one, and, therefore, only a 
language in name, and the contract would obviously not reflect any 
genuine agreement of the parties, nor would the contract be subject to 
“interpretation”—its terms would simply be dictated by the party with 
the right to “interpret” it. Any true contract—one that reflects a mutual 
agreement of the parties—must, therefore, be interpreted by a third 
party. And, of course, that third party will usually be a court or private 
arbiter. 
Some of the most fundamental limits on the liberty of contract are 
therefore inherent in the limitations of language. The terms of a contract 
cannot be self-enforcing. Nor can they be self-interpreting.193 Indeed, the 
parties themselves cannot contract for the interpretation of the contract 
in the contract. For one thing, if they attempt to specify how a particular 
right or obligation is to be interpreted, their language will confront the 
same limitations of the language used to specify the right or obligation 
itself. Since the specification of how the contract is to be interpreted 
would itself have to use language, and since that use of language would 
be subject to all the same limitations, the parties would merely add an 
additional interpretive hurdle to their dispute.194 Perhaps more 
importantly, since there is an unavoidable need for third party 
interpretation of any contract term, the notion that the parties themselves 
 
 191.  BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 37 (1993) (“Wittgenstein . . . 
has shown that there is no fact of the matter to prove that I mean the same thing by my current use 
of a word as I did by a former use . . . .”). 
 192.  Marc A. Loth, Limits of Private Law: Enriching Legal Dogmatics, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1725, 1726 (2007) (citing Wittgenstein for the proposition that rules are not self-applying). 
 193.  Id. at 1726. 
 194.  Of course, this does not mean that a merger clause or other contract term bearing on the 
interpretation of the contract would be of no value to a judge or arbiter; it merely means that such a 
contract term could not by itself govern the interpretation of the contract. 
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could contract for the interpretation of the contract is illogical.195 
Since the parties to any complex contract would have to rely on a 
third party to interpret the language, they would have to specify how 
their language was to be interpreted to ensure that it would be 
unambiguous. But the language specifying how the language was to be 
interpreted would itself have to be interpreted. The only way of avoiding 
an infinite regress of clauses specifying how clauses were to be 
interpreted would be by including a self-referential clause that specified 
how the contract, including the clause itself, was to be interpreted. A 
complete and unambiguous contract could thus only be defined by a set 
of statements about the parties’ rights and obligations plus an additional, 
self-referential statement about how the statements were to be 
interpreted. Unfortunately, self-referential systems of rules and logic are 
well-known to yield paradoxes and inconsistencies.196 
Suppose the parties to a contract execute a written instrument, but 
suppose there is also parol evidence that contradicts the writing. A court 
that relies exclusively on the writing to interpret the contract would 
probably rule differently than a court that relied exclusively on the parol 
evidence.197 A court that used both the writing and the parol evidence to 
interpret the contract might rule either way. But suppose the parties 
include in their writing a merger clause stating that the writing is a 
complete and final expression of their agreement. Some courts might be 
persuaded by the merger clause to exclude the parol evidence. But from 
a purely theoretical perspective, and setting aside any concerns about the 
reliability of the evidence,198 there is no reason why a court should 
privilege certain kinds of language, such as the language used in writing, 
over other kinds of language, such as verbal statements. 
As a matter of logic, a court would need to interpret the contract to 
determine whether the parties meant to exclude parol evidence before it 
could exclude the parol evidence on the grounds that the contract 
excluded it.199 And there is no logical reason why the court should not 
 
 195.  This is not meant to suggest that any of the neo-formalists have ever said otherwise. 
 196.  There is a debate about whether Godel’s Theorem implies that a complete and consistent 
legal system is logically impossible. See generally Kevin W. Saunders, What Logic Can and Cannot 
Tell us About Law, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 667 (1998). The point being made here is closely 
related, but it does not rest on Godel’s Theorem. 
 197.  Ricks, supra note 188, at 803 (“[T]he meaning of contractual language might be clear 
within the four corners of the document but ambiguous or different outside of that context or when 
more context is added.”). 
 198.  The parol evidence rule is, after all, a rule of contract law and not a rule of evidence. 
 199.  Loth, supra note 192, at 1732 (“In legal theory it is an accepted proposition that the 
application of law, or the identification of a legal proposition, presupposes an interpretation of the 
law.”). 
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consider parol evidence in interpreting whether the parties intended the 
contract to exclude parol evidence.200 It is possible that the parties’ oral 
agreement might have contradicted a clause in the writing even though 
the parties also agreed orally that the writing would be a complete and 
final statement of their agreement. Of course, it would be much more 
likely that if the parties’ oral agreement contradicted certain terms in the 
writing, it would also contradict any merger clause in the writing. Thus, 
if a court did consider the parol evidence, this would likely raise some 
ambiguity about the interpretation of the contract. It would at least raise 
the possibility that two courts, or the same court at different times, might 
reach inconsistent interpretations—especially if they applied different 
versions of the parol evidence rule.201 
The limitations of language and logic thus cast considerable doubt 
on the merits of a strict parol evidence rule. But there are more practical 
reasons to doubt the wisdom of a strict parol evidence rule. A strict parol 
evidence rule would, in general, work to the advantage of stronger 
parties and the disadvantage of weaker ones. In most cases where there 
is a single written instrument, it is drafted by one party and signed by the 
other. In fact, the scenario is ripe for the formation of a contract of 
adhesion.202 The drafter is typically the party with more economic 
resources and greater sophistication; even where both parties are 
merchants, the writing may take a standard form and the weaker party 
may be given a take-it-or-leave-it offer.203 The terms of the writing are 
therefore more likely to reflect the interests of the stronger party than 
those of the weaker one, and a strict parol evidence rule would therefore 
work to the advantage of the stronger party at the expense of the weaker 
one. 
Of course, when a court enforces the terms of a written agreement it 
exercises the power of State coercion. If the term that the court was 
enforcing was not one that the weaker party had truly assented to, then 
the State’s coercive powers would, in effect, be used against the weaker 
party on behalf of the stronger party.204 If, on the other hand, the court 
 
 200.  Id. The logic appears to have been persuasive. Thus, for example, U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 
1(c) (2001) rejects the idea that a court needs to find a writing to be ambiguous before it will 
consider parol evidence. 
 201.  This is consistent with H.L.A. Hart’s conception of the law as “open-textured” in the 
sense that its rules will always be indeterminate because of the nature of language and the contexts 
in which it is applied. Loth, supra note 192, at 1726. 
 202.  See, e.g., Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesions—Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) for the classic article. 
 203.  Id. at 632. 
 204.  As Friedrich Kessler observed, therefore, courts that are conscious of the imbalance in 
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declined to enforce an obligation of the stronger party because of “fine 
print” in the written instrument that had been drafted by the stronger 
party, even though both parties understood the obligation to have been 
agreed upon, then the court would, in effect, facilitate a kind of 
malfeasance perpetrated by the stronger party against the weaker one.205 
Unfortunately, the State’s coercive powers would probably be used on 
behalf of the powerful against the weak much more commonly than they 
would be used on behalf of the weak against the powerful.206 
2. Unconscionability 
The modern doctrine of unconscionability allows a court to void a 
contract or terms of a contract on the grounds that the terms are so 
unfavorable to a party that enforcing them would cause oppression and 
unfair surprise.207 It is commonly thought to provide a way for courts to 
regulate bargains. Since that sounds like interference with a market 
transaction, the doctrine of unconscionability has been widely criticized 
by scholars who favor liberty and free markets.208 While the doctrine 
would pose a serious threat to liberty if it was applied inappropriately, 
concerns about the doctrine may have been overstated, and its virtues 
may have been understated. In fact, in some cases the doctrine of 
unconscionability may provide a legal justification for courts not to 
allow the stronger party to an agreement to use the courts and the power 
of State coercion to enforce wrongful claims against the weaker party.209 
Unconscionability has a confounding and controversial history.210 
 
the bargaining power of the parties have gone to great lengths to interpret the parties’ contracts 
equitably for the weaker parties. Id. at 633. 
 205.  Kessler thus observed that courts might try to interpret the contract to satisfy the weaker 
party’s “reasonable expectations” and cited Karl Llewellyn’s observation that oral evidence can 
provide the basis for interpreting contracts that reflect the parties’ “life situation.” Id. at 637. 
 206.  As HAYEK, supra note 7, at 141, observed, “That other people’s property can be 
serviceable in the achievement of our aims is due mainly to the enforceability of contracts. The 
whole network of rights created by contracts is as important a part of our own protected sphere, as 
much the basis of our plans, as any property of our own.” To the extent that rules of contract 
interpretation favored the stronger against the weak, they might also implicate the State in helping 
the stronger parties to usurp the rights of the weaker parties. 
 207.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1977) (“The principle is one of the prevention of 
oppression and unfair surprise.”). 
 208.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & 
ECON. 293 (1975). 
 209.  See the discussion, infra this Part. 
 210.  The history of the unconscionability doctrine is integral to the history of the development 
of modern contract law. See Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract 
Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974) for a discussion of the “sound price” rule and the vestiges of 
equity in modern contract law. 
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As the doctrine is most commonly described and applied today, it 
involves a two-pronged test.211 The first prong applies a test for 
procedural abuse, which is proved by evidence of sharp dealing, 
deceptive bargaining tactics, and unequal bargaining power—generally 
anything that suggests there was a flaw in the bargaining process.212 The 
second prong applies a test for substantive abuse, which is proved by 
evidence that the terms are so one-sided and grossly unfair that it would 
be inequitable to enforce them.213 The two-pronged test did not actually 
originate in the case law; it was actually first described in a law review 
article by Arthur Leff.214 Leff carefully reviewed the discussions and 
debates between members of the Permanent Editorial Board of the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the 
American Law Institute during the drafting of Section 2-302 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), but he struggled in deciding whether 
to advocate a two-pronged test because it was far from clear whether the 
drafters intended that procedural abuse should be required.215 He 
ultimately decided that a two-pronged test would be best and that is what 
he advocated.216 
It remains doubtful whether the drafters of Article 2 intended that 
the doctrine of unconscionability should entail the application of a two-
pronged test. As Leff documented, the drafters’ discussions and debates 
did not make this clear, nor do the cases cited in the Official Comments 
to Section 2-302 of the UCC.217 In fact, what is most remarkable about 
the cases cited in the Official Comments is that none of them even 
mentions the word “unconscionability” and all of them can be construed 
as cases about questions of contract interpretation.218 Indeed, there is a 
fine line between regulating a contract and interpreting it, and 
unconscionability cases are often, expressly or impliedly, ones about 
contract interpretation.219 As Robert Hillman points out, guile at the 
bargaining stage of an agreement often goes hand-in-hand with an 
 
 211.  See, e.g., CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL 155 (1999). 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. 
PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967). 
 215.  Id. at 489-501. 
 216.  Id. at 487. 
 217.  Id. at 489-501. 
 218.  Donald J. Smythe, Consideration for a Price: Using the Contract Price to Interpret 
Ambiguous Contract Terms, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 109, 126-32 (2013). 
 219.  ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 
OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW 41 (1997). 
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overreaching interpretation of contract terms later on.220 Many 
unconscionability cases thus bear more than a superficial resemblance to 
ones about contract interpretation.221 To put this in another perspective, 
one might wonder how the terms of an agreement could have been truly 
bargained-for if they are so grossly unfair that it would be inequitable to 
enforce them. And if they were not truly bargained-for, could they really 
have been part of the agreement? 
Unconscionability cases therefore raise questions about the courts’ 
exercise of State coercion in enforcing contractual obligations. If the 
terms of a contract are unconscionable, they were arguably not truly 
bargained-for, and the party against whom enforcement of the terms is 
sought did not really assent to be bound by them. If a court enforced the 
contract under those circumstances, it would use the State’s power of 
coercion to enforce a claim by the stronger party against the weaker 
party, even though the weaker party did not consent to subject itself to 
the State’s coercive powers. Under such circumstances, a court would 
arguably further liberty by using the unconscionability doctrine to void 
the purported contractual obligations. 
Of course, a court that applied the unconscionability doctrine in 
circumstances in which the weaker party did assent to the contract terms, 
and therefore did impliedly consent to the use of the State’s coercive 
powers to enforce the contract claim, would undermine the freedom of 
the parties to commit themselves to binding agreements. The doctrine of 
unconscionability, therefore, is a double-edged sword: It has an 
important role to play in advancing liberty, but it can also be abused. Its 
abuse, however, would not directly interfere with liberty. When a court 
declines to enforce a contractual obligation it merely declines to exercise 
the State’s coercive powers to bind the parties to a purported agreement. 
The court does not thereby exercise any coercion or even interfere with 
the parties’ agreement. Of course, although this does not directly 
undermine liberty, it does diminish the efficacy of contract law, and the 
application of the unconscionability doctrine should, therefore, be 
limited to the appropriate circumstances. Nonetheless, if the primary 
purpose of the State is to advance liberty, there is an important role for 
the doctrine of unconscionability in modern contract law. 
3. Impracticability 
Sometimes, after a contract has been formed, a party seeks to be 
 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  See generally Smythe, supra note 218. 
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excused from performance of an obligation. This has led to the 
development of legal doctrines under which courts will grant parties 
excuses from contractual obligations.222 The doctrine of impossibility 
was the first excuse doctrine to emerge from the case law. Under the 
doctrine of impossibility a party may be granted an excuse from the 
performance of a contractual obligation if the party’s performance has 
become impossible.223 The classic example is one in which a party has 
contracted to provide a music hall for a concert, but in between the 
formation of the contract and the concert date the music hall is destroyed 
in a fire.224 The second excuse doctrine to emerge from the case law was 
the doctrine of frustration of purpose. Under the frustration of purpose 
doctrine a party may be excused from performance of a contractual 
obligation if the basic purpose of the contract has been frustrated.225 The 
classic example is one in which an apartment has been rented for a day 
to view a parade, but the parade is postponed to another day, and the 
party’s purpose in renting the apartment is, therefore, frustrated.226 
The doctrine of impracticability was the third, and arguably most 
important, excuse doctrine to emerge from the cases. Under the doctrine 
of impracticability a party may be excused from performance of its 
contractual obligations if its performance has become impracticable, in 
the sense that it would cause severe economic hardship, due to 
unforeseen supervening events since the time of contracting.227 The 
classic example is one in which a party has contracted to build a bridge, 
but discovers that, due to difficult soil conditions that were unknown at 
the time of contracting, the construction costs will be several times 
larger than expected and that building the bridge will cause the party to 
suffer severe economic hardship, if not complete financial ruin.228 The 
doctrine of impracticability is probably most relevant today, since it has 
been adopted in Section 2-615 of the U.C.C.229 and, arguably, also in 
Article 79 of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods.230 
 
 222.  See Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine of Impracticability, and the 
Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227, 227-29 (2004) for an 
overview of the development of excuse doctrines. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Taylor v. Caldwell, (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 310 (Q.B.). 
 225.  Smythe, supra note 222, at 228. 
 226.  Krell v. Henry, (1903) 2 K.B. 740. 
 227.  Smythe, supra note 222, at 236-38. 
 228.  Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 156 P. 458, 459 (Cal. 1916). 
 229.  U.C.C. § 2-615 (2014) (discussing breach, repudiation, and excuse). 
 230.  U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, at 24-25, U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.14. 
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The trend in the law has clearly been to grant excuses in a broader 
range of circumstances, beginning with the physical impossibility of 
performance and culminating in the mere economic impracticability of 
performance.231 The broadening scope of contractual excuse doctrines 
has concerned some commentators who fear that parties may be able to 
use them to evade contractual obligations opportunistically.232 This is a 
legitimate concern. Nonetheless, the manner in which the concerns have 
been stated may, at times, have misconstrued a court’s role in 
adjudicating contractual disputes. For example, some scholars have 
criticized courts for interfering with the allocation of parties’ risks when 
they grant contractual excuses.233 
Strictly speaking, even if courts misapply excuse doctrines and 
allow them to be used opportunistically, they do not interfere with the 
risk allocations in the parties’ agreements. In fact, if anything at all, they 
merely decline to enforce the risk allocations. There is an important 
difference between a court using its coercive powers to change the risk 
allocations in an agreement and a court declining to use its coercive 
powers to bind parties to an agreement. In the former case, the court 
would undermine liberty because it would use the power of State 
coercion against a party’s will; in the latter case the court would not use 
the power of State coercion at all. Moreover, it would be a mistake to 
presume that courts have run amuck and granted too many excuses when 
they should not have done so.234 
One of the overarching principles of modern contract law is the 
principle of party autonomy.235 The parties to a contract are free to 
 
 231.  Smythe, supra note 222, at 228. 
 232.  See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term 
Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1985); Alan O. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial 
Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1990); and George G. Triantis, 
Contractual Allocations of Unknown Risks: A Critique of the Doctrine of Commercial 
Impracticability, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 450 (1992). 
 233.  See generally Gillette, supra note 232; Sykes, supra note 232; and Triantis, supra note 
232. See also Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
2005 (1987). 
 234.  Robert Scott observed, “The most curious aspect of the commercial impracticability cases 
decided over the past 20 years has been the courts’ steadfast refusal to grant excuse for 
nonperformance despite the apparent invitation to do so in the Uniform Commercial Code and the 
Second Restatement.” Scott, supra note 233, at 2006 n.1. 
 235.  The principle is reflected, for example, in U.C.C. § 1-302 (1977) (Variation By 
Agreement section of the Uniform Commercial Code) as well as the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Article 6. U.N. COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE LAW, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS, at 3, U.N. Sales No. E.10.V.14 (“The parties may exclude the application of this 
Convention or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”). 
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contract around any of the default rules that will apply to their 
agreement, except for certain basic rules, such as the doctrine of good 
faith or fair dealing requirements.236 This means that almost all contract 
rules and doctrines can be waived or modified by express agreement. As 
Randy Barnett observed, the parties to a contract impliedly agree to all 
the rules and doctrines that courts will apply to adjudicate any disputes 
unless they expressly waive or modify them under the terms of their 
bargain.237 That includes any excuse doctrines that might apply to the 
parties’ contract, either under a case precedent or a statute.238 Thus, if 
courts do apply the doctrine of impracticability and grant an excuse, it is 
impliedly under the terms of the parties’ bargain.239 Even if courts 
inadvertently apply an excuse doctrine when they should not, that is a 
risk the parties will have bargained-for; in other words, courts do not 
thereby disturb the allocation of risks in the parties’ agreements. 
Perhaps even more importantly, one might doubt whether courts do 
commonly misapply excuse doctrines. The doctrine of impracticability, 
for example, is normally applied using a two-pronged test.240 Although 
the cases do not apply the test consistently, under the most persuasive 
interpretation of the test, courts will grant an excuse only if the 
circumstances giving rise to the impracticability claim were reasonably 
unforeseen at the time of contracting and if the party under the 
obligation would be subjected to severe economic hardship if required to 
perform.241 It seems implausible that any party could have truly agreed 
to perform an obligation under circumstances that were not reasonably 
foreseeable and if performing the obligation would cause such a severe 
hardship, especially if the parties did not expressly waive the application 
of the impracticability doctrine. If a court failed to grant an excuse and 
compelled the party’s performance, it would thus exercise the power of 
State coercion to force the party to engage in a performance it did not 
truly assent to. In other words, it would force the party to perform 
against its will. The State’s power of coercion would, in effect, be used 
to provide a contractual right that was not truly bargained-for to one 
party at the expense of the other party. 
 
 236.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (1977) (“The obligations of good faith, diligence, 
reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the Uniform Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by 
agreement.”) (emphasis added). 
 237.  Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. 
L. REV. 821, 864-65 (1992). 
 238.  Smythe, supra note 222, at 264. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Id. at 236. 
 241.  Id. 
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Excuse doctrines are thus also a double-edged sword: If they are 
applied inappropriately they facilitate opportunism by a party seeking to 
evade an obligation it had agreed to perform; if they are not applied 
when they should be, and the party seeking an excuse is forced to 
perform, then the court uses the State’s power of coercion against that 
party’s will. If the primary purpose of the State is to protect liberty, then 
there is also an important role for the doctrine of impracticability in 
modern contract law. 
C. Lifestyle Covenants and Morals Clauses 
To earn a living in a modern industrial economy most people have 
little alternative but to sell their labor services to an employer. The terms 
and conditions of employment contracts therefore influence the 
freedoms and opportunities that most individuals enjoy. Unfortunately, 
employment contracts sometimes impinge on employees’ personal 
autonomy. Some employers, for example, require employees to sign 
lifestyle covenants or morals clauses,242 which may proscribe or require 
certain lifestyle choices or moral decisions that are not directly related to 
the duties of the employee’s job.243 Some colleges and universities also 
require that new students as well as employees sign similar lifestyle 
covenants.244 Lifestyle covenants and morals clauses raise difficult 
questions about the role of contract law in employment relationships and 
the importance of respecting individuals’ autonomy and privacy. 
 
 242.  The systematic use of lifestyle covenants and morals clauses dates at least to the middle 
of the twentieth century. Indeed, some important cases arose during the McCarthy era, when film 
directors, writers, and actors were alleged to have violated morals clauses through their political 
associations. See, e.g., Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 87-88 (9th Cir. 1957); 
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1954); and Loew’s, 
Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 644-45 (9th Cir. 1950). 
 243.  For some recent examples, see, Dustin Siggins, Catholic Archdiocese Expands Morality 
Clause for School Employees After Losing Lawsuit, LIFESITENEWS.COM (Mar. 10, 2014, 2:47 PM), 
http://www.lifesitenews.com/news/catholic-archdiocese-expands-morality-clause-for-school-
employees-after-los; Jessica Martinez, Attorneys of Ind. Teacher Fired From Catholic School for In 
Vitro Procedure Argue Church Doctrine Is Irrelevant in Lawsuit, THE CHRISTIAN POST: CHURCH & 
MINISTRY (Feb. 7, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.christianpost.com/news/attorneys-of-ind-teacher-
fired-from-catholic-school-for-in-vitro-procedure-argue-church-doctrine-is-irrelevant-in-lawsuit-
114195/; and Rebecca S. Green, Jury Sides with Fired Teacher, THE JOURNAL GAZETTE (Dec. 20, 
2014, 1:03 AM), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/courts/Jury-sides-with-fired-teacher-
4094706. 
 244.  For an example of a case in Canada that has recently raised a controversy about whether a 
new law school that requires students and employees to sign lifestyle covenants should be approved, 
see Andrea Woo, Lawyers File Challenge Over B.C.’s Approval of Trinity Western Law School, 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 3, 2014, 9:51 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-
columbia/lawsuit-filed-against-bc-government-over-trinity-western-approval/article21435054/. 
51
Smythe: Liberty at the Borders of Private Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
01 SMYTHE - MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:19 PM 
52 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:01 
For example, suppose a Roman Catholic school requires all 
employees to sign a morals clause, regardless of whether their duties 
include any responsibility for teaching Catholic doctrine or participating 
in any Catholic services.245 Suppose an employee who teaches languages 
and who has no responsibilities related to Catholic teachings or services 
is discharged from her job for using in vitro fertilization to become 
pregnant, thus violating the morals clause in her contract. Suppose her 
discharge did not give her any causes of action against her employer 
under any federal or state laws. Although one might sympathize with her 
for losing her job, under the employment-at-will rule that prevails in 
United States employment law, and given that an exception might not 
apply, she might be left with no legal recourse against her employer.246 
Cases such as this are complicated because they raise questions 
about the scope of the employers’ religious freedoms as well as the 
discharged employees’ autonomy. Religious organizations have been 
exempted to some extent from anti-discrimination laws that might 
protect their employees from encroachments on their autonomy under 
the “ministerial exception.”247 The ministerial exception protects 
religious organizations’ freedom of religion and association by 
exempting them from the reach of any laws that would prevent them 
from using religious criteria in selecting or discharging their religious 
leaders.248 But employees who are not ministers are still often required 
to sign lifestyle covenants and morals clauses as part of the terms of 
their employment.249 And the termination of an employee for violation 
 
 245.  See, e.g., Martinez, supra note 243. 
 246.  At the time of writing, this is still unclear. In the case that motivated this example the 
employee won a judgment at trial for her employer’s violation of a federal gender discrimination 
statute, but the employer is still seeking to have the judgment overturned. See Associated Press, 
Fired Teacher Asks Judge to Reject Request to Reject Verdict, CNSNEWS.COM (Jan. 21, 2015, 8:06 
PM), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/fired-teacher-asks-judge-reject-request-reject-verdict. 
 247.  The ministerial exception arises as a matter of constitutional law; it is not a statutory 
exception. See Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 248.  See E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 
2000) (where no spiritual function is involved, the First Amendment does not stay the application of 
a generally applicable law); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 
S. Ct. 694, 697-98 (2012) (“called” teachers, as opposed to “lay” teachers, are “ministers” within 
the ministerial exception); and Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 11-CV-00251, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 43240, at *17 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2012) (plaintiff’s mere association with a religious 
school is insufficient to make her a minister and subject her to the ministerial exception). 
 249.  In many cases, the employees are not even members of the religion. For a discussion 
about Catholic schools requiring teachers to sign morals clauses that require adherence to Catholic 
doctrine, see Sandhya Dirks, Morals Clauses Prove Controversial For Catholic School Teachers, 
NPR (July 15, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/07/15/331751394/morals-clauses-prove-
controversial-for-catholic-school-teachers. 
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of a lifestyle covenant or morals clause might not give rise to any cause 
of action under an anti-discrimination statute or other law, even though 
the discharge might impinge upon rights and privileges within the 
employee’s sphere of personal autonomy and privacy.250 
Nonetheless, lifestyle covenants and morals clauses do not in and of 
themselves involve the exercise of coercion. When an employer requires 
an employee to sign a lifestyle covenant or morals clause, there is 
generally no direct exercise of coercion, either by the employer or the 
State. There is no exercise of coercion by the employer or the State when 
an employer discharges an employee for the employee’s lifestyle choices 
or moral decisions either. Under the employment-at-will doctrine, 
employers have a right to discharge employees for any cause, or even no 
cause at all,251 and courts only exercise State coercion directly when they 
enforce private legal rights. In fact, if a court awarded damages to the 
employee for wrongful discharge, it would be using the power of State 
coercion against the employer on behalf of the employee. But the issue 
is more complicated than that, and an employee’s liberty is implicated 
even though there is no direct exercise of coercion by the employer or 
the State. 
Lifestyle covenants and morals clauses are a market phenomenon, 
like any other. Perhaps the important questions are: Why does the 
employer bargain for them? And why would the employee agree to 
them? The answers are easy. In the example above, the Catholic school 
probably bargains for a morals clause that forbids employees from using 
in vitro fertilization because in vitro fertilization would violate Catholic 
doctrine.252 And the employee probably agrees to the restriction because 
she needs the job or the job pays better than the alternatives and it is 
worth it to her to sacrifice some of her autonomy by signing the 
clause.253 In fact, there are many reasons why an employee might not 
care about such a restriction: She might agree with Catholic doctrine and 
want to adhere to it as far as possible in her personal life, she might be 
beyond child bearing years, or she simply might not anticipate that it 
would ever bind her personal choices. But there might also be cases in 
which an employee does care about the restriction and agrees to it, 
 
 250.  See, e.g., the McCarthy era cases cited, supra note 242. 
 251.  Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 517-18 (Tenn. 1884) (overruled on other 
grounds). Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 135 (Tenn. 1915) (employers may discharge or retain 
employees at-will for good cause or for no cause or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty 
of an unlawful act per se). 
 252.  See, e.g., Dirks, supra note 249. 
 253.  According to Dirks, eighteen percent of the teachers at one Catholic high school who 
were required to sign a morals clause were not even Catholic. Id. 
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nonetheless, because she wants the job. Presumably, if an employee does 
actually violate a morals clause then the clause is either one she would 
rather not have been bound to when she contracted with her employer or 
it became one that she did not want to remain bound to sometime after 
she became an employee. 
Lifestyle covenants and morals clauses provide ways for employers 
to control their employees’ lifestyle choices and moral decisions about 
matters that bear no relation to the employee’s work duties. Outside the 
scope of a narrowly defined ministerial exception, the idea that an 
individual’s lifestyle choices and moral decisions can be controlled by 
her employer should grate on the conscience of any serious advocate for 
liberty. Although the employer might not exercise any direct physical 
coercion over the employee, the use of a contract clause to control her 
behavior subjects the employee’s lifestyle and moral decisions to a kind 
of economic coercion.254 Given most employees’ dependence on their 
jobs for income, the threat of termination operates through the fear of 
deprivation and want. And while it is true that prospective employees are 
not forced to sign the covenants and clauses, they lose gainful 
employment opportunities if they do not.255 
Of course, the law offers some protections. In addition to 
protections under antidiscrimination statutes,256 it is possible, for 
example, that the morals clauses could, at times, be unconscionable. In 
employment contracts, the employer often has a preponderance of 
bargaining power since the employee typically has fewer employment 
options than the employer has potential employees to choose among; the 
employer also typically has considerably more legal sophistication and 
 
 254.  EPSTEIN, supra note 32, at 47 observes that the concentration of market power itself can 
seem coercive, even though no force or fraud are actually involved. In cases where market power 
helps gain acceptance to contract clauses that intrude into individuals’ spheres of personal autonomy 
and privacy, the concerns should be greater. 
 255.  Recall that HAYEK, supra note 7, at 20-21 defined coercion to mean “such control of the 
environment or circumstances of a person by another that, in order to avoid great evil, he is forced 
to act not according to a coherent plan of his own but to serve the ends of another.” 
 256.  Several courts have held that federal and/or state anti-discrimination statutes applied in 
cases where employees were terminated for violating lifestyle or morals clauses. See, e.g., Vigars v. 
Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 802, 806 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Cline v. Catholic 
Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 668 (6th Cir. 1999); and Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 
1:11-CV-00251, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43240, at *24 (S.D. Ohio, Mar. 29, 2012). In some cases, 
however, anti-discrimination statutes have not protected discharged employees. See, e.g., Nader v. 
ABC Television, Inc., 150 F. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005); Arbor Leasing, LLC v. BTMU Capital 
Corp., No. 603151/2006, 2014 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 138, at *5-6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2014); and 
Galaviz v. Post-Newsweek Stations, No. SA-08-CA-305, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59603, at *21-24 
(W.D. Tex. July 13, 2009). 
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normally drafts the lifestyle covenant or morals clause.257 But it seems 
doubtful whether many lifestyle covenants or morals clauses are truly 
unconscionable. Employers who require their employees to sign the 
clauses typically want the employees to be fully aware of the 
restrictions. If a lifestyle covenant or morals clause is not 
unconscionable—if it is, in fact, truly bargained-for—then it would seem 
to be within the parties’ freedom of contract. And, in any case, under the 
employment-at-will rule, an employer may usually discharge employees 
for any cause or for no cause at all, which presumably includes lifestyle 
choices and moral decisions.258 Indeed, the employment-at-will rule 
itself is within the parties’ freedom of contract. 
In contracts between individuals—meaning natural persons—and 
other individuals, the freedom of contract argument is compelling. One 
of the rights within the sphere of personal autonomy and privacy that 
individuals should enjoy is the freedom to associate with whomever they 
like. A free individual, therefore, has a right to include a lifestyle 
covenant or morals clause in her contracts with other free individuals. 
Other free individuals, of course, have a right to choose whether or not 
to bind themselves to contracts that constrain their lifestyle choices or 
moral behavior. Moreover, in a well-functioning employment market the 
employee might normally receive some form of consideration for the 
restraints; the employer, on the other hand, might normally have to 
provide some consideration in return for the restraints.259 The market 
would thus provide a disincentive against such restraints, but it would 
allow them if they increased the surplus derived from the contract by 
both the employer and the employee.260 
The market would also provide a disincentive against lifestyle and 
moral restraints in contracts between for-profit corporations and 
individuals. For-profit corporations are created under state statutes, and 
they enjoy rights and privileges under state and federal laws;261 they are, 
in that sense, State-sponsored entities, and the State is thus complicit in 
their actions. But because they have shareholders who expect a return on 
 
 257.  Kessler, supra note 202, at 631-32 observed that standardized contracting practices have 
diffused into labor markets and that they are typically “used by enterprises with strong bargaining 
power.” 
 258.  Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 517-18. 
 259.  Thus, free market economists and libertarian scholars have often placed their confidence 
in the freedom of contract and the discipline of the market. For a classic statement of the argument 
that the market disciplines and discourages parties from basing their decisions on non-economic 
considerations see MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 108-19 (2002). 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 34. 
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investment, they are ultimately subject to the discipline of the market.262 
A for-profit corporation that pays a premium to employees for signing 
lifestyle covenants and morals clauses would normally do so only if this 
was expected to increase profits or if the shareholders, as a group, were 
willing to sacrifice some of the profits in return for the corporation’s 
pursuit of non-economic objectives. A well-functioning market might 
thus provide a disincentive against the lifestyle restraints, and one would 
expect to observe them only if they increased surplus for both the 
shareholders and the employees.263 
It is not surprising, therefore, that for-profit corporations rarely 
require their employees to sign lifestyle covenants or morals clauses and 
rarely discharge employees for their lifestyle choices and moral 
behavior.264 If they do discharge employees for their lifestyle choices or 
moral behavior, they might in fact pay a significant price, especially if 
the case receives much adverse publicity.265 In the years to come, the 
public’s increasing awareness of the issues, the pervasive and growing 
respect for personal autonomy and freedom, and the dramatic 
advancements in the dissemination of news through modern social 
media will probably provide stronger disincentives against discharges of 
employees for their lifestyle choices and moral behavior, at least by for-
profit corporations.266 Social disapprobation and the discipline of the 
market may thus be sufficient to protect individuals’ personal autonomy 
against encroachments by for-profit corporations. In any case, for-profit 
corporations do not provide the greatest threat to employees’ liberty. 
The greatest threat to employees’ liberty comes from non-profit 
 
 262.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 259, at 108-19. 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  In the for-profit sector, lifestyle covenants and morals clauses are probably most common 
today in entertainment industries such as television, film, and professional sports. Of course, these 
are all industries in which personal images and reputations can significantly affect profits. For a 
discussion of the role of morals clauses in the sports and entertainment industries, see Fernando M. 
Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals? An Examination of Morals 
Clauses in Talent Contracts and What Talent Needs to Know, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
347 (2009). As a general matter, the employees subject to lifestyle covenants and morals clauses in 
these industries—often actors and athletes—are also subject to the discipline of the market through 
their right of publicity and their prospects of losing valuable future advertising endorsements. See 
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 83-90. 
 265.  Of course, as the McCarthy era cases, supra note 242, illustrate, that is not always the 
case. In fact, the truth is that for-profit employers might risk losing profits for not terminating 
employees who make lifestyle choices or moral decisions that violate widely accepted social norms. 
 266.  Market discipline ultimately operates through the values and choices of individual 
producers and consumers. Thus, if consumers expressly or implicitly boycott employers who 
intrude into their employees’ autonomy and privacy or terminate employees for their lifestyle or 
moral decisions, for-profit employers who continue to do so will lose their market shares. 
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corporations. Indeed, many of the employers who require employees to 
sign lifestyle covenants or morals clauses are religious ones, often 
schools, colleges, or universities. They are generally organized as non-
profit corporations under state statutes and benefit from significant rights 
and privileges under both federal and state law.267 For example, they 
generally do not pay corporate income taxes or property taxes,268 even 
though they clearly benefit from the State’s protection of their property 
rights as much as individuals and for-profit corporations. In fact, since 
they do not pay taxes even though they receive direct government 
subsidies and services, they are implicitly subsidized by other 
taxpayers.269 
Because they generally receive implicit tax subsidies, and because 
they are not formed to earn profits, non-profit corporations are not 
subject to the same degree of discipline by the market as for-profit 
corporations.270 It is not surprising therefore that they appear to use 
employment contracts to regulate their employees’ lifestyle choices and 
moral decisions more commonly than for-profit corporations.271 One of 
the ironies is that they receive an implicit tax subsidy from the 
employees whose lifestyle choices and moral decisions they may seek to 
control. Indeed, some of their economic and market power no doubt 
derives from their tax subsidies since they would almost certainly have 
fewer financial resources and less market power if they were required to 
pay income taxes, property taxes, and sales taxes and compete on an 
equal footing in the marketplace with for-profit corporations.272 The 
rights and privileges conferred upon them by the State thus help to 
maintain the economic power that they may then use to control their 
employees’ lifestyle and moral decisions. 
This Article presumes that a sphere of personal autonomy and 
privacy is essential to liberty. Indeed, intrusions into individuals’ 
 
 267.  For a complete description of the subsidies as well as an attempt to quantify them, see 
Ryan T. Cragun, Stephanie Yeager & Desmond Vega, How Secular Humanists (and Everyone Else) 
Subsidize Religion in the United States, 32 FREE INQUIRY 39 (2012). 
 268.  They also receive significant tax-deductible personal donations and benefit from direct 
subsidies such as those under the federal government’s Faith-Based Initiatives. Id. at 41. 
 269.  Id. 
 270.  It is worth noting that the economic power they derive from their subsidies may also 
augment their political power and influence. Id. at 45. 
 271.  See, e.g., Siggins, supra note 243; Martinez, supra note 243; and Green, supra note 243. 
 272.  A conservative estimate of the total subsidy to religious organizations in the United 
States calculates it at about forty percent of the total subsidy to agriculture. Cragun et al., supra note 
267, at 43. Of course, this is the total subsidy to all religious organizations and not just those that 
provide schooling or health services and hire significant numbers of non-clerical employees. It 
nonetheless offers a useful perspective. 
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autonomy to decide matters as private as whom they engage in sexual 
relationships with, whether to use birth control or assisted reproductive 
technologies, and whether to have an abortion, impinge upon some of 
their most basic human dignities. There are well-established protections 
under the United States and state constitutions as well as federal and 
state statutes against State intrusions into the sphere of individuals’ 
autonomy and privacy, but liberty is also compromised when State-
sponsored entities that receive significant tax subsidies are able to use 
their financial resources and economic power to control their employees’ 
lifestyle choices and moral behavior, especially when the choices and 
behavior have no relationship to the employees’ job responsibilities. 
Liberty would be advanced, therefore, if non-profit corporations were 
constrained from intruding into their employees’ autonomy and privacy 
in the same ways that the State is constrained from intruding under the 
U.S and state constitutions. 
There are several practical ways in which non-profit corporations 
could be constrained from intruding into their employees’ liberty: 1) 
since they are generally created under state statutes, they could be 
constrained through the statutes under which they are created; 2) they 
could be regulated under the federal and state tax laws—for example, 
federal tax laws could be revised to preclude non-profit corporations 
from qualifying as public charities and receiving federal income tax 
exemptions if they required employees to sign lifestyle covenants or 
morals clauses; and 3) courts could constrain them by expanding the 
scope of wrongful-discharge laws. This could be accomplished by 
narrowing the ministerial exception that may exempt religious 
organizations from lawsuits under anti-discrimination statutes and by 
broadening the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule so 
that a nonprofit corporation that receives tax exemptions as a public 
charity could be sued for discharging an employee for violating a 
lifestyle covenant or morals clause or for making a lifestyle choice or 
engaging in moral behavior that would be protected by the United States 
or state constitutions against intrusions by the State. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored the relationship between private law and 
liberty. To that end, it has defined liberty to require that individuals be as 
free as possible from the exercise of coercion by others, including the 
State, except to the extent that they have truly and voluntarily assented 
to the coercion, and that individuals have a sphere of personal autonomy 
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and privacy within which they are free from intrusions by the State and 
others to think what they will, say what they want, associate with 
whomever they like, and be whoever they are. This sphere of personal 
autonomy and privacy may be thought of as being similar to the rights 
and privileges accorded to individuals against the State under the United 
States and state constitutions, although in an ideal world those rights and 
privileges would arguably be defined even more broadly. 
There are many important ways in which private law doctrines may 
advance liberty. For example, common law courts have developed and 
refined doctrines, such as the first in time rule, the finders rule, and the 
rule for adverse possession in property, or the parol evidence rule, the 
doctrine of impracticability, and the doctrine of unconscionability in 
contracts, that appear to advance liberty by limiting the exercise of 
coercion by individuals against other individuals directly or by 
individuals against other individuals indirectly using the power of the 
State. Indeed, it may have been largely through the spontaneous order of 
the common law that individuals in common law nations have enjoyed 
the liberty that has enabled them to experiment, innovate, muse, and 
reflect, thus spawning intellectual advancement, material progress, and 
cultural refinement, not only for themselves but for others too. 
Nonetheless, as social conditions and economic practices evolve, 
there will always be ways in which further refinements in the law can 
advance liberty. This Article has explored some of the important ways in 
which liberty in the United States could be advanced by refining the 
system of private legal rights. It has focused in particular on problems 
that have wide and increasing importance for many people across most 
states: the impingement on individuals’ liberty caused by the 
enforcement of some private land-use restrictions, and the intrusion into 
employees’ personal autonomy and privacy wrought by the lifestyle 
covenants and morals clauses in the employment contracts that some 
employers use and enforce. The State is always complicit in the former, 
because court enforcements of private laws always involve the exercise 
of the State’s power of coercion. The State is not necessarily complicit 
in the discharge of employees for their lifestyle or moral decisions, but it 
is complicit if the employer is a State-sponsored entity, such as a non-
profit corporation that is created under state statutes and receives 
significant tax exemptions that are tantamount to implicit tax subsidies. 
Legislatures and courts have a responsibility to mitigate these 
problems. This Article proposes some concrete options. To begin with, 
liberty would be advanced if courts were restrained in the enforcement 
of private land-use restrictions in all the ways that the State is restrained 
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in enforcing public land-use restrictions. In other words, all of the 
federal and state constitutional constraints that apply against public land-
use restriction should also apply against courts’ enforcement of private 
land-use restrictions. In an ideal world, the constraints would be applied 
under a more expansive application of the State action doctrine, one that 
recognized the judiciary as a branch of government and the courts as 
State actors. Since it seems unlikely that the State action doctrine is 
going to be expanded any time soon, it might be more efficacious for 
state legislatures to constrain courts by enacting statutes that apply all 
the federal and state constitutional constraints to private land-use 
restrictions as a matter of state law. In the absence of action by state 
legislatures, state courts themselves could adopt new holdings that 
would make private land-use restrictions unenforceable as a matter of 
public policy whenever they would be unconstitutional as public land-
use restrictions. 
There are several practical ways in which State-sponsored non-
profit corporations could be constrained from invading their employees’ 
liberty. First of all, they could be constrained through the statutes under 
which they are created. They could also be constrained through revisions 
to the federal and state tax laws that would preclude them from 
qualifying as public charities and thus receiving tax exemptions if they 
required employees to sign lifestyle covenants or morals clauses, or if 
they discharged employees for lifestyle choices or moral behavior. If 
legislatures failed to act, courts could constrain them by narrowing the 
ministerial exception that often exempts religious non-profit 
corporations from lawsuits under anti-discrimination statutes, and by 
broadening the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule so 
that a nonprofit corporation that receives tax exemptions as a public 
charity could be sued for discharging an employee for making lifestyle 
choices or engaging in moral behavior that would be protected by the 
United States or state constitutions against intrusions by the State. 
The advancement of liberty is the most fundamental purpose of the 
State. History has taught us that governments cannot engineer social 
progress or material welfare, but it has also taught us that if people are 
given the liberty to do what they will, think and act as they like, and live 
their lives as freely as possible, they will thrive personally, socially and 
materially. The State nonetheless plays a pivotal role in fostering 
individuals’ personal happiness, cultural enlightenment, and material 
welfare because the power of State coercion is essential to liberty. 
Unfortunately, the State may undermine liberty by failing to take the 
actions necessary to protect it, or by taking actions that encroach upon it. 
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The State’s role in creating and enforcing private laws is no less 
important to liberty than its role in creating and enforcing public laws, 
and the State may undermine liberty by failing to develop and apply 
private law doctrines that are necessary to advance liberty or by 
enforcing private law doctrines that encroach upon it. 
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